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I. INTRODUCTION
The indiscriminate nature of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)1 technology
creates unique privacy issues.2   Currently privacy standards for the type of information 
gathered through RFID and the use of that information do not exist.3  With few 
exceptions, compatible readers may legally access from a remote location RFID devices 
and the information these devices contain.  After gathering information, the legal uses of 
that information are innumerable in terms of aggregation and re-use. 
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1 Radio Frequency Identification refers to technology contained in a number of devices with the ability to 
transmit identifying information wirelessly, such as medical implants in a person, prescription drugs carried 
by that person, and the clothing the person is wearing.  See Ari Juels, RFID Privacy: A Technical Primer 
for the Non-Technical Reader, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY 
CONVERSATION 57, 60 (Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu, eds., 2006).  For further discussion of 
RFID and its application, see generally Roy Want, RFID: A Key to Automating Everything, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN MAGAZINE, Jan. 2004, at 56. 
2 Randal Jackson, “Promiscuous” RFID a Data Threat, Warns Privacy Watchdog, COMPUTERWORLD, 
Sept. 3, 2007, http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/news/D83E8424E8F435F6CC2573470082076B. 
3 Catherine Rampell, Google Calls for International Standards on Internet Privacy, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 
2007, at D01 (noting that critic Marc Rotenberg of the Electronic Privacy Information Center equates 
Google’s call for privacy standards to “someone being caught for speeding saying there should be a public 
policy to regulate speeding”).  The National Institute of Standards and Technology, a nonregulatory agency 
of the U.S. Department of Commerce, published technical guidelines for deploying RFID in April 2007 
including security standards but noted that, “[p]rivacy considerations are interrelated with security 
considerations.”  NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION
800-98, GUIDELINES FOR SECURING RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID) SYSTEMS:
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS  AND TECHNOLOGY, at 6-14 (2007),
available at  http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-98/SP800-98_RFID-2007.pdf [hereinafter NIST
RFID GUIDELINES].
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1347762
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RFID is a part of everyday life already.  Everyone has had the experience of pushing 
a shopping cart around a grocery store.4  Often one has a credit card on hand at the time.5  
By doing so, personal shopping patterns and preferences may now be associated with 
credit information and financial data and aggregated for marketing firms interested in 
targeting a certain demographic.  A car could have a license plate with RFID technology 
to track personal movements.6  A reader may track all this information from up to 12 
miles away.7  Many individuals do not care if others obtain an infinite amount of 
personally identifying data through their shopping, credit, and personal travel activities; 
however, they provide their data free of charge and without limits on its use despite that it 
is a valuable asset for which businesses are presumably willing to pay.  Businesses make 
money from collecting personal information.8 
The indiscriminate nature of RFID technology arises from ease of access of the 
information in that anyone with a compatible reader can connect to RFID devices9 found 
                                                 
4 (Meijer promotes its use of RFID as a way to improve its understanding of  the amount of time customers 
spend in the store and to help staff crucial areas, such as check-out lines.  See RFID News: Will RFID 
Tracking of Shopping Carts In-Store Add Value – or Raise More Privacy Concerns?, 
SUPPLYCHAINDIGEST, Nov. 9, 2006, http://www.scdigest.com/assets/newsViews/06-11-09-
1.cfm?cid=759&ctype=content.  Though that raises the question of whether employees really need 
technology to see when check-out lines need additional staffing.  Id. (“We can’t help but think Meijer is at 
least considering the possibility for additional intelligence as a potential benefit of the technology, available 
for the price of a few more readers.”). 
5 Frequently, such credit cards are “no-swipe,” enabled with an RFID microchip.  This has raised serious 
privacy concerns for some.  despite credit card companies’ claims that information is encrypted, 
researchers ran tests on 20 different major credit cards using a device “cobbled together from readily 
available computer and radio components” and were able to obtain the cardholder’s name, card number and 
expiration date.  This information can be read through a wallet or item of clothing. See John Schwartz, 
Researchers See Privacy Pitfalls in No-Swipe Credit Cards, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2006, at C1;  see also 
Shane L. Smith, Gone in a Blink:  The Overlooked Privacy Problems Caused by Contactless Payment 
Systems, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 213, 259 (2007) (“[M]erely emblazoning a logo on contactless 
payment devices to allow users to get comfortable with an RFID-enabled microchip's presence does 
nothing to protect individuals' privacy.”). 
6 Tagged License Plates in the UK, RFID NEWS, Aug. 9, 2005, 
http://www.rfidnews.org/weblog/2005/08/09/tagged-license-plates-in-the-uk.  See also Benjamin Burnham, 
Comment, Hitching a Ride:  Every Time You Take a Drive, The Government is Riding With You, 39 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 1499, 1500-02 (2006); Manoj Govindaiah, Driver Licensing Under the REAL ID Act:  
Can Current Technology Balance Security and Privacy?, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 201, 206-09 
(2006). 
7 Claire Swedberg, Gentag to Commercialize Super RFID Technology, RFID JOURNAL, Sept. 12, 2007, 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/3610. 
8 For example, start-up companies are building services that specialize in tracking people and their 
reputations using information found on MySpace, Amazon.com’s Wishlists, and Facebook.  They then sell 
the profiles to other companies for marketing and sales purposes. Heather Green, It Isn’t Just YourSpace 
Anymore, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2007, a 13.   
9 Jackson, supra note 2. 
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in clothes, humans, animals, and an array of individual products,10 including prescription 
medicine.11  However, the proliferation of uses for RFID technology, with its vast 
informational capacity and no universal standard for privacy protection, contributes to the 
promiscuity.12    
 RFID holds great promise as a “disruptive” technology that will reshape the way 
individuals live.13  The privacy concerns addressed here apply to data collected by RFID 
in particular, but also other indiscriminate technologies that are similarly disruptive.  
Already businesses successfully and conscientiously utilize disruptive technology in 
areas such as inventory control.  As an early adopter of RFID, the United Kingdom 
retailer Marks & Spencer, received a great deal of public recognition for working with 
privacy advocates14 and carefully considering principles of privacy protection while 
utilizing RFID for inventory and other operations efficiency gains.15 
Prior to the introduction of RFID tags Marks & Spencer checked inventory the old 
fashioned way, by employing people to count and record all the unsold goods in its stores 
and warehouses and then checking counts against inventory records.  With the advent of 
RFID, Marks & Spencer adopted real time inventory control.  It began putting RFID tags 
                                                 
10 Todd Lewan, Microchip Implants Raise Privacy Concerns, WASHINGTON POST, July 21, 2007, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/21/AR2007072100637.html. 
11 Bob Brewin, FDA Backs RFID Tags for Tracking Prescription Drugs, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 23, 
2004, http://www.computerworld.com/industrytopics/healthcare/story/0,10801,90368,00.html.  See also 
Bryan A. Liang, Structurally Sophisticated or Lamentably Limited?  Mechanisms to Ensure Safety of the 
Medicine Supply, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 483, 485 (2006); Suchira Ghosh, Note, The R.F.I.D. Act of 
2006 and E-Pedigrees: Tackling the Problem of Counterfeit Drugs in the United States Wholesale Industry, 
13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 577, 578 (2007). 
12 NIST RFID GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 2-5 (“For most applications, the increased speed and operating 
range are considered advantages.  One exception is applications for which security or privacy is a 
significant concern, such as those that involve financial transactions or personal data.”). 
13 See Philip Cochran, Mohan Tatikonda & Julie Manning Magid, Radio Frequency Identification and the 
Ethics of Privacy, 36:2 ORG. DYNAMICS 217, 219 (2007) (“Such new technologies ultimately reshape the 
way in which individuals work and live as well as the ways that organizations are designed and function.”). 
14 The two major privacy advocate organizations challenging business’ adoption of RFID technology are 
Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering (CASPIAN) and Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, although there are many other privacy advocacy groups and sponsors involved in the use of 
RFID and related technologies.  See, e.g., Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, RFID Position Statement of 
Consumer Privacy and Civil Liberties Organizations (Nov. 20, 2003), 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/RFIDposition.htm (“Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an item-
tagging technology with profound societal implications. Used improperly, RFID has the potential to 
jeopardize consumer privacy, reduce or eliminate purchasing anonymity, and threaten civil liberties.”).   
15 As a United Kingdom retailer, Marks & Spencer is subject to European Union privacy laws, including 
the Data Privacy Directive, Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EU).  We use the Marks & 
Spencer example only insofar as the retailer worked with privacy advocates championing the Fair 
Information Privacy Principles to protect personal privacy.  For further discussion of the European Union 
privacy perspective, see infra notes 91-95 and text accompanying. 
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at the item-level; a trial that expanded to all its stores.16  However, the retailer took many 
steps to ensure that the personal information of individuals was not at risk because of 
RFID in the stores.17  It provided notice to store customers by distributing leaflets 
explaining RFID and marking each tag “Intelligent Label for stock control use.”18  The 
tags only provided information about the product (color, size, style, etc.) through a 
unique product number.19  The RFID tags were passive so they emitted no signal and 
presented no health risks to the customers.20   
To protect consumer privacy, Marks & Spencer took care to comply with the 
voluntary guidelines known generally as the Fair Information Practice Principles 
(FIPP).21  Nonetheless, several practical issues arose.  The first issue was that Marks & 
Spencer chose to curtail severely the use of RFID.  Implementing RFID at the item-level, 
and then only using it for inventory control, means the retailer is not making full use of 
the technology in other areas such as marketing and customer service.22  It is not 
reasonable to expect all firms to invest in this type of technology for very limited 
purposes.23  Retailers employing inconsistent standards for their use of RFID may result 
16 Marks & Spencer RFID Expansion Tackles Privacy Issue, RFID UPDATE:  THE RFID INDUSTRY DAILY, 
Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.rfidupdate.com/articles/index.php?id=789.  
17 Id. 
18 Id. (“But perhaps the most impressive component of the Marks & Spencer RFID trial expansion is the 
forthcoming approach it will take with customers: leaflets explaining RFID technology and Marks & 
Spencer's use thereof will be available at all 53 stores.”). 
19 Andy McCue, Marks & Spencer Tags Shirts with RFID, SILICON.COM, Oct. 17, 2003, 
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/hardware/emergingtech/0,39020357,39117192,00.htm. 
20 Will Hadfield, Marks & Spencer Expands RFID Trial as it Moves Closer to Decision Over Full Roll-out, 
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM, April 4, 2006, 
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2006/04/04/215168/marks-spencer-expands-rfid-trial-as-it-
moves-closer-to-decision-over-full.htm (noting that the passive tags require shop assistants to trigger 
reading device). 
21 Federal Trade Commission, Fair Information Practice Principles, 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.htm ( “[The] five core principles of privacy protection [are]: 
(1) Notice/Awareness; (2) Choice/Consent; (3) Access/Participation; (4) Integrity/Security; and (5)
Enforcement/Redress.”).  See infra Part II.C.3 for additional discussion of FIPP.
22 But see Marks & Spencer RFID Expansion Tackles Privacy Issue, RFID UPDATE:  THE RFID INDUSTRY 
DAILY, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.rfidupdate.com/articles/index.php?id=789 (“Folks, take note. This is 
how it should be done. Marks & Spencer has taken into account and balanced its own interests with those 
of consumer privacy groups, and it has crafted a program that respects the customer while reaping the 
benefits of item-level RFID tagging.”). 
23 See, e.g., Carol Sliwa, Suppliers Eye RFID Data, Search for Potential Uses, COMPUTERWORLD, March 
7, 2005, http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=100221 
(discussing Wal-Mart’s implementation of RFID). 
5 / RFID and Privacy Law 
in consumer backlash and tight government control that impact all potential users and 
uses of RFID.24   
Even with a limited use of the technology, FIPP is an outdated view of privacy for 
advanced technology such as RFID.  Apparently, the supposition made by Marks & 
Spencer is that, after adequate notice, the customers consent to the use of RFID by 
remaining in the store and choosing to purchase products.  If customers object to RFID, 
they must stop shopping at that retailer.  Research does not support this supposition.25 
The first two principles of FIPP, notice and consent, particularly rely on questionable 
assumptions.  The parameters of notice and consent were devised about the same time 
that economic theory understood privacy as concealing information.26  Individuals could 
choose to conceal their personal information but economists believed the best result was 
achieved through revealing the information so that it could flow freely.27  Economics now 
understands privacy more broadly as a class of interests.28  Individuals are unlikely to act 
rationally when making decisions about privacy sensitive information.29  Notice to an 
individual that a firm is collecting information that will be used for various transactions 
does not take into account privacy market failure.30  Reasons that individuals do not act 
appropriately include incomplete information, bounded rationality, and psychological 
distortions (including the desire for immediate gratification).31  Marks & Spencer avoided 
this problem by not connecting customer information with purchases.32  Still, this came at 
the loss of greater application of, and benefits from, the technology. 
                                                 
24 See Customers to Retailers: Take Us Seriously, CIO MAGAZINE, Dec 1, 2003, at 87 (“If retailers fail to 
consider these concerns, they may end up wasting money on pilots and deployments if legislation passes 
preventing item-level tagging.  However, if retailers take these issues seriously, they'll reduce the risk of the 
government banning item-level RFID. . . .”). 
25 See infra Part IV. 
 
26 See George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 624 
(1980). 
27 See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 213-225 (1961) (the seminal 
article on information costs); see also Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, The Impact of Opt-In Privacy 
Rules on Retail Credit Markets: A Case Study of MBNA, 52 DUKE L.J. 745, 746 (2003) (“Economists have 
long recognized that the costs of acquiring information and arranging transactions are like sand in the gears 
of commerce.”).  
28 See Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy in Electronic Commerce and the Economics of Immediate 
Gratification, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM ELECTRONIC COMMERCE CONFERENCE 21, 22 (2004). 
29 Id. 
30 See Paul Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2076 (2004) (“The 
emerging verdict of many privacy scholars is that existing markets for privacy do not function well.”). 
31 See Acquisti, supra note 30, at 23-24.  
32 See infra notes 91-95 and text accompanying (noting stringent European Union regulations concerning 
personal information). 
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Notice and consent also assumes that individuals reveal personal information and do 
not intend to retain some level of control over it.  Current behavioral theory suggests that 
recipients of personal information should not use the information freely.33  Disclosing 
individuals expect the recipient to co-manage the information along with them.34  The 
sociological theory of social networks contributes toward understanding the process of 
information dissemination.35  It suggests an individual expects personal information to 
remain within a controlled group to which the individual has ties.36  For instance, a 
customer of Marks & Spencer might not worry if the retailer has her credit card 
information, but does not want that information conveyed to unfamiliar firms.   
Theories from different academic perspectives agree that the idea of giving 
consumers notice about the use of their personal information, and obtaining their consent 
to the immediate use as well as any future use, does not adequately address the privacy 
expectations held by individuals.37  Simply stated, these theories suggest that notice does 
not equal awareness, and that choice does not always mean informed consent.   
Marks & Spencer took individuals’ privacy into account when creating policies 
concerning its item-level RFID tags, but as a result it adopted policies that do not make 
full operational use of the technology.  A future challenge is to develop privacy standards 
that go beyond the narrow understanding of privacy evidenced in FIPP, while allowing 
increased efficiency and effectiveness through the use of RFID.  We address this 
challenge by integrating several theoretical lenses of privacy in this paper and applying 
an integrative approach to data collected using RFID.38  The intent of this article is 
twofold.  First we provide a baseline definition of privacy beyond the legal precedents 
and understanding, by incorporating other theoretical perspectives so as to frame broadly 
our discussion of RFID data collection.  Second, we begin the discussion of potential 
                                                 
33 See generally Sandra Petronio, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: DIALECTICS OF DISCLOSURE 9 (2002). 
34 Id. at 10. 
35 See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 946-
47 (2005) (“The basic challenge of network theory is to understand how change occurs and is transmitted 
among adjacent units in any kind of network.  Perhaps surprisingly, the same basic insights about network 
structure have been found applicable to a variety of disparate disciplines.”); see also DUNCAN J. WATTS, 
SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003).   
36 See Strahilevitz, supra note 35, at 954-55. 
37 See infra Part IV. 
38 We do not mean to suggest that we are the first to apply diverse academic perspectives to privacy law.  
See, e.g., Ian Altman, Privacy Regulation:  Culturally Universal or Culturally Specific?, 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 
66 (1977) (discussing privacy in the context of cultural norms); Stephen T. Margulis, Privacy as a Social 
Issue and Behavioral Concept, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 243 (2003) (offering a bridge between social psychology 
and social issues approaches to privacy and exploring behavioral aspects of privacy); Strahilevitz, supra 
note 35, at 919 (applying social network theory to the reasonable expectation of privacy standard of tort 
law).  Nonetheless, our approach advances this interdisciplinary literature by incorporating diverse 
academic research into an integrative model. 
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solutions to managing private data obtained through RFID technology with an emphasis 
on data expiration policies as an important component of data retention practices.    
In Part II of this paper, we provide the relevant background for our discussion, 
including the capabilities of RFID and related technologies that raise issues of privacy 
protection.  The current regulation of technology and attempts to legislate RFID 
technology is highlighted.  
In the first portion of Part III, we examine the law and economics underpinnings of 
privacy law as an important base for the specific concerns raised by RFID.   The second 
portion of Part III outlines legal models for further expansion of individual privacy rights 
in light of expanding technological capabilities.  We argue that current legal scholarship 
often fails in two crucial aspects when considering regulation of technology with privacy 
implications.  The first, as seen in the Marks & Spencer example, demands limiting the 
operational use of the technology and discouraging developing the full potential of 
technological advances.  The second is that the legal theory does not incorporate 
adequately a range of important understandings about privacy gleaned from economic, 
behavioral, and sociological research.   
In Part IV we discuss three theoretical lenses concerning privacy: behavioral 
economics, communications privacy management, and social networks.  Each lens offers 
relevant insight for evaluating privacy law and constructing privacy rights while 
permitting technological advancement.   
We advocate in Part V for an integrative privacy approach utilizing the three crucial 
Integrative Considerations gleaned from our integrative theoretical research: 1) 
individuals expect to own, control, and share personal information even after disclosing 
it;  2) advancing technologies raise concerns about individuals’ bounded rationality and 
ineffective analysis of the costs and benefits of disclosing personal information;  and 3) 
the significant threat to personal privacy comes not from the initial disclosure of personal 
information but from the subsequent re-use, transfer to third parties, and aggregation of 
that information.  This Part concludes by applying the Integrative Considerations to data 
collected by RFID.  This integrative approach requires limits on information obtained 
through RFID, including the types of information gathered, the time frame in which the 
information is used and then expired, and the re-use and transfer of information. 
In addition to our focus of offering self-regulation standards for RFID data collection, 
an additional benefit of recognizing the significant threats to personal privacy from RFID 
technology permits developing law to focus on these crucial aspects without 





The unique and pervasive capabilities of RFID provide context for our discussion of 
individual information privacy.  Our focus is on the data generated through RFID 
technology while norms for governing this information are lacking.  
 
A. Radio Frequency Identification Technology 
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An RFID tag often is described as the next generation of bar codes or as a “super” bar 
code.39  Broadly speaking, RFID consists of a microchip attached to an antenna.  The 
microchip of the tag can be as small as a grain of rice with an antenna spanning anywhere 
between 1/8 to 2 inches.40  RFID systems are comprised of three main components:  1) 
the RFID tag, or transponder, which is located on the object to be identified and is the 
data carrier in the RFID system, 2) the RFID reader, or transceiver, which may be able to 
both read data from and write data to a transponder, and 3) the data processing subsystem 
which utilizes the data obtained from the transceiver in some useful manner.41   
The RFID system grants the user the capabilities of tracking and obtaining very 
detailed information about the object to which the tag is attached.42  RFID tags fall into 
two categories: active or passive.  Active tags are equipped with an onboard power 
source whereas passive tags are activated by the electromagnetic signal sent by the RFID 
reader.43   
RFID tracking capabilities can increase dramatically the power of logistic and supply 
chain management giving rise to many potential competitive advantages for businesses 
that choose to implement the technology.  RFID technology has the potential to replace 
totally the traditional optically scanned barcodes due to the technology’s numerous 
benefits.44  For example, a stationary RIFD reader can instantaneously read entire boxes 
                                                 
39 See generally  NIST RFID GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 2-1 (“Today, people typically perceive the label 
identifying a particular object of interest as static, but RFID technology can make this label dynamic or 
even ‘smart’ by enabling the label to acquire data about the object even when people are not present to 
handle it.”). 
40 Sanjay E. Sarma et al., RFID Systems, Security & Privacy Implications, AUTO-ID CENTER-
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, WHITE PAPER 1, 16 (Nov. 1, 2002), 
www.autoidlabs.org/whitepapers/MIT-AUTOID-WH-014.pdf. 
41 Id. 
42 See Juels, supra note 1, at 59 (“In some ways RFID endows computer systems with the ability to ‘see’ 
everyday objects including visually obstructed objects and distinguish between objects that are physically 
identical.”). 
43 See Sarma, supra note 40, at 16; see also Ephraim Schwartz, The Case for Active RFID, INFOWORLD, 
June 21, 2005, 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/06/21/26OPreality_1.html?BUSINESS%20INTELLIGENCE%20AP
PLICATIONS. 
44 The benefits of RFID in comparison to traditional optically scanned tags, according to Simson Garfinkel 
of MIT, are: 
1. Optical barcodes need to be in plain view to be read; RFID tags can be read through 
fabric, paper, cardboard, and other materials that are transparent to the frequency of 
operation. 
2. Traditional optical barcodes are limited to 13 digits of information, and two-
dimensional barcodes are limited to several hundred; RFID tags can store hundreds 
or thousands of bytes of information. 
3. Only a single optical barcode can be read at a time; dozens of RFID tags can be read 
at the same time with a single reader. For example, an RFID reader could be used to 
read all of the individually tagged items within a case of merchandise. 
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of inventory information for truckloads of goods in a matter of seconds, from feet or even 
miles away; whereas RFID’s predecessor, the bar code, involves reading each individual 
item or pallet, one by one, with a scanner that demands close range and even unpacking 
or rearranging of boxes of goods.45  Compared to the bar code, RFID chips can store 
exponentially more data at a cost per chip as low as 5 cents and falling. 
At 200 tags per second, an incoming truckload could be scanned at a loading dock by 
a freestanding RFID reader in a matter of seconds depending on whether the shipment 
was tagged by pallet or by individual item.  Assuming that each item is equipped with its 
own unique RFID tag, a grocery shopper could bag his or her groceries while shopping, 
pack them in the cart, and as he or she exited the store an RFID reader could scan all of 
the contents of cart in less than one second.46  By incorporating readers into check-out 
lines, loading docks, and other points of data gathering, RFID technology provides 
benefits to business operations by reducing labor and time needed, and by increasing the 
accuracy of information about the location of inventory and other physical assets.47  
The retail world is capitalizing already on the benefits of RFID.  In fact, at the 
retailer’s behest, more that 600 suppliers have started shipping RFID-tagged pallets and 
cases to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.48  However, the effectiveness of the technology is still 
relatively low as the infrastructure and data processing means have not yet been 
                                                                                                                                                 
4. Optical bar codes are read-only; advanced RFID tags can store information and 
perform limited processing. 
5. Optical bar codes are promiscuous, in that any reader can read any compatible 
optical bar code that comes in range; RFID tags can be assigned a password, limiting 
who has the ability to read them. 
6. The only way to deactivate an optical bar code is by obliterating or obscuring it; 
RFID tags can be electronically deactivated.  
Simson L. Garfinkel, Adopting Fair Information Practices to Low Cost RFID System, MASSACHUSETTS 
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY-LABORATORY FOR COMPUTER SCIENCE,  (2002), 
http://www.simson.net/clips/academic/2002.Ubicomp_RFID.pdf.  See also NIST RFID GUIDELINES, supra 
note 3, at 2-1 (“RFID products often support other features that bar codes. . . do not have, such as 
rewritable memory, security features, and other environmental sensors that enable the RFID technology to 
record a history of events.”). 
45 See NIST RFID GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 2-1.  Typically the information on an RFID tag is simply a 
tracking number with the personal data stored on a server.  Theft of data through interception of the RFID 
signal, often the perceived danger, is not the main privacy threat.  Id. at 4-5 (noting that with the 
accumulation of tagged items “the potential for more complex associations and inferences increases”). 
46 But see Juels, supra note 1, at 62 (NCR conducted a pilot of auto-shopping cart inventory and found 
good scanning range can pose problems because customers sometimes paid for purchases of those behind 
them in line). 
47 See Will Sturgeon, Las Vegas Casino Goes for RFID, SILICON.COM, April 15.2005,  
http://software.silicon.com/security/0,39024655,39129583,00.htm (noting that a Las Vegas casino uses 
active tags to tag restaurant employees for the purpose of time and motion studies, but that many 
employees have complained). 
48 See Sliwa, supra note 23. 
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perfected.49  Commentators agree that RFID’s full impact is not imminent, but these 
commentators vary on predictions about the timing of RFID’s proliferation.50 
The serious privacy issues raised by RFID technology are becoming ubiquitous as 
society inevitably transitions into the era of pervasive computing, information, and 
identification technologies.  Beyond RFID alone, other potentially privacy-invading 
technologies exist and include biometric identification, GPS-enabled devices, sensor 
networks and personal data chips.51  When RFID systems connect to other privacy-
invading technologies, the resulting information concerning individuals becomes quite 
revealing.52  The focus of our discussion is on privacy issues associated with the 
collection and re-use of information obtained through RFID technology. 
 
B.  Privacy Definitions and Concepts 
 
Our focus is on individual information privacy.  We define privacy as the “control of 
personal information by the individual.”53  Personal information can be any data about 
the individual.  Control is the individual’s ability to regulate the flow of personal 
information to other parties; that is, to retain (keep secret, protect, keep confidential, 
secure, conceal, or restrict) or disclose (reveal, share, transfer, or inform) that personal 
information under the conditions and to the parties of the individual’s choosing.  In all, 
privacy is not so much the actual retention of information, but rather the ability to choose 
to retain or disclose personal information.  Finally, our definition emphasizes that, 
although full retention and full disclosure represent endpoints on a spectrum, there also 
exist mixed and intermediate forms of information retention and disclosure.54  
                                                 
49 RFID tags presently are unreliable because of signal interference caused by some metals and liquids. See 
Juels, supra note 1, at 63 (“[B]ecause human beings consist largely of water[, i]f you are worried about 
your RFID-tagged sweater being scanned, your best course of action may be to wear it.”).   
50 See RFID Market to Reach $7.26 Bn in 2008, IDTECHEX, April 10, 2005, 
http://www.idtechex.com/research/articles/rfid_market_to_reach_7_26bn_in_2008_00000169.asp 
(predicting that the global RFID market will continue to grow and reach $24.50 billion by 2015).  But see 
Juels, supra note 1, at 61 (predicting RFID impact between the years 2015 and 2020). 
51 See generally PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 
(Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu, eds., 2006) (providing a collection of perspectives 
concerning emerging technologies and their impact on privacy). 
52 Jackson, supra note 2. 
53 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy:  A Fortress or Frontier for Individual 
Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. L. J. 195, 208 (1992) (“The American legal system does not contain a 
comprehensive set of privacy rights or principles that collectively address the acquisition, storage, 
transmission, use and disclosure of personal information within the business community.”). 
54 See ALLAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (describing informational privacy as “the claim 
of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others.”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 477, 562-563 (2006) (“Protecting privacy requires careful balancing, as neither privacy nor its 
countervailing interests are absolute values.  Unfortunately, due to conceptual confusion, courts and 
legislatures often fail to recognize privacy problems, and thus no balancing ever takes place.”); Strahilevitz, 
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Significantly, giving up (disclosing) personal information is different from giving up 
control over personal information.  
Although the United States Supreme Court recognizes some limited areas of privacy, 
there are many other conceptualizations of privacy.55  Extant research aims to cut through 
this definitional clutter by categorizing individual privacy.56  For example, one 
commentator identifies four “factual principles” of individual privacy:  physical privacy, 
decisional privacy (an individual’s independence in making important decisions), 
informational privacy57 (an individual’s ability to avoid disclosure of personal matters) 
and communications privacy.58  In contrast, others identify broad areas of individual 
privacy based on activity context:  medical privacy,59 workplace privacy60 and consumer 
privacy.61  
It is also necessary to differentiate the motivations for maintaining privacy from the 
actual practice of maintaining privacy.62  An individual may choose not to disclose 
certain personal information due to shyness, embarrassment, or concern about potential 
resulting harms.63  Or the individual may choose not to disclose certain information 
because she knows that information has economic value to some other party.  So she 
                                                                                                                                                 
supra note 35, at 921 (“[T]he law should focus on the more objective and satisfying question of what extent 
of dissemination the plaintiff should have expected to follow his disclosure of that information to others.”). 
55 See Solove, supra note 54, at 479 (“Privacy seems to be about everything, and therefore it appears to be 
nothing.”). 
56 But see Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1130 (2002) (concluding there 
is no singular essence or core characteristics found in all privacy law). 
57 But see Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as the Object, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 1373, 1427-28 (2000) (“[I]nformational privacy, in short, is a constitutive element of civil society 
in the broadest sense of the term.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. 
L. REV. 1609, 1613 (1999) (“Informational privacy is best conceived of as a constitutive element of civil 
society.”). 
58 Lisa S. Nelson, Constructing Policy: The Unsettled Question of Biometric Technology and Privacy, in 
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 151, 153 (Katherine 
Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu, eds., 2006).  
59 Robert Gellman, Personal, Legislative, and Technical Privacy Choices:  The Case of Health Privacy 
Reform in the United States, VISIONS OF PRIVACY:  POLICY CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE, 129, 134 (Colin 
J. Bennett & Rebecca Grant, eds., 1999). 
60 See, e.g., Eugene F. Stone & Diane L. Stone, Privacy in Organizations:  Theoretical Issues, Research 
Findings, and Protection Mechanisms, 8 RESEARCH IN PERSONNEL AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
349, 350 (1990). 
61 See, e.g., Curtis R. Taylor, Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer Information, 35 RAND J. 
ECON. 631, 635 (2004). 
62 But see Fred H. Cate, Principles for Protecting Privacy, 22 CATO J. 33, 36 (2002) (“[P]rivacy tends to be 
a one-sided issue.  Who is against it?”). 
63 See Petronio, supra note 33, at 49-50. 
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waits until another party offers sufficient compensation for that information.64  In these 
examples, the mechanisms for maintaining privacy may well be the same, but the 
motivations are notably different.  In the first example, the personal information has 
internal value to the individual, so much so that she might pay someone to leave that 
information alone.65  In the second example, the personal information (e.g., the 
individual’s preference for automotive make and color) has external value, and she might 
let others compensate her to obtain that information.66 
Privacy is not always perceived favorably.  Some view privacy positively because it 
can protect individuals and allows the functioning of a free society.67  Others view 
privacy quite negatively because any privacy at all impedes the free flow of information, 
increases search costs in economic transactions, and makes markets less efficient.68  
Some economists even equate “privacy” with “secrecy” and all its concomitant negative 
connotations.69  And yet others view privacy more neutrally and in a situational light, 
because maintaining privacy can allow negative outcomes, including personal 
misrepresentations, morally questionable behavior, and illegal activities, while giving up 
privacy can allow positive outcomes, including richer customer-supplier relationships and 
improved service.  
On the recipient side, information acquisition can be overt (explicit and apparent to 
the individual, as occurs when filling out a registration form) or covert (without advance 
notice of the information collection activity to the individual, as with surreptitious 
monitoring such as the use of Internet “cookies”).  Intermediate forms exist as well.70 
Finally, we note that privacy is very contextual, personal, cultural, and dynamic.71  
Not all information is equally private, nor do different individuals treat similar 
information as having the same level of privacy.  An individual might care more, or less, 
about privacy in different settings and at different times in life and society.72  And how 
                                                 
64 See Taylor, supra note 61, at 633 (noting that consumers who anticipate the sale of their information 
“misrepresent their preferences by strategically refusing to buy [from the firm] if it sets a high price”). 
65 Id. at 635. 
66 See Staten & Cate, supra note 27, at 786 (noting the efficiencies and benefits of target marketing). 
67 See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L. J. 421, 455 (1980) (“Privacy is also 
essential to democratic government because it fosters and encourages the moral autonomy of the citizen, a 
central requirement of democracy.”). 
68 See, e.g., Cate, supra note 62, at 37 (noting that privacy laws emphasizing control of information create 
significant costs without yielding net benefits). 
69 See Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 405, 405-09 (1981). 
70 Anna E. Shimanek, Do You Want Milk with Those Cookies? Complying with the Safe Harbor Privacy 
Principles, 26 J. CORP. L. 455, 459-61 (2001). 
71 See Petronio, supra note 33, at 38-83. 
72 See Strahilevitz, supra note 35, at 959-66 (discussing cultural and strategic considerations in sharing 
information based on three empirical studies involving topics as diverse as HIV status, academic discipline, 
and bakery closings). 
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one treats his or her personal information can be quite different from how one treats and 
places importance on someone else’s personal information.73  
 
C.  The Reach of Privacy Legislation and Regulations 
 
 Privacy law at both the federal and state level has developed inconsistently over time and 
typically in response to a specific threat.  That trend continues with legislation aimed at regulating 
the use of RFID. 
 
1. Federal Law 
 
Two broad themes are apparent in federal law pertaining to individual privacy.74  The 
first theme is preventing intrusion on individuals by the government.75  This is addressed 
in the U. S. Constitution.  The second theme is preventing the use of information by the 
private sector that (unfairly) harms consumers.76  This is addressed in various federal acts 
comprising the federal statutes.77  
Although the U. S. Constitution does not overtly address the privacy of individuals, 
aspects of privacy are referenced throughout the Bill of Rights Amendments to the 
Constitution.  These appear most notably in:  the First Amendment,78 guaranteeing the 
right to free speech, freedom of religion, and the right to association; the Fourth 
Amendment,79 protecting against unlawful search and seizure;80 the Fifth Amendment,81 
                                                 
73 Id.  See generally Andrew Askland, What, Me Worry?  The Multi-Front Assault on Privacy, 25 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 33 (2006).                         
74 Cate, supra note 62, at 36. 
75 Id. 
76 Id.  See generally Grayson Barber, Personal Information in Government Records:  Protecting the Public 
Interest in Privacy, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 63 (2006); Lars S. Smith, RFID and Other Embedded 
Technologies:  Who Owns the Data?, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 695 (2006) 
(describing the development of law to protect consumers’ information). 
77 The Fair Credit Reporting Act, for example. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).  A full discussion of the federal 
laws with important privacy implications, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C), is outside the scope of this RFID discussion.  However, for a discussion of 
privacy policies in recent federal legislation, see Corey A. Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information 
Privacy: Privacy Policies as Personal Information Protectors, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 55, 72-88 (2007) 
(proposing an E-Commerce Privacy Protection Awareness Act (EPPAA) based on the FIPP principles). 
78 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
79 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  See Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for 
Shared Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y, 211, 237-245 (2006); Reepal S. 
Dalal, Note, Chipping Away at the Constitution:  The Increasing Use of RFID Chips Could Lead to an 
Erosion of Privacy Rights, 86 B.U.L. REV. 485, 486 (2006). 
80 Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”) 
with Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (addressing whether the use of a thermal imaging 
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guaranteeing freedom from self-incrimination;82 and the Ninth Amendment,83 addressing 
general liberties.   
However, there are limits to the constitutional privacy protections.84  Constitutional 
privacy protections do not extend to the private sector’s interaction with consumers.85  
The Constitution does not prohibit the collection and use of personal information by 
private firms unless Congress enacts specific legislation.86  Congress is generally reticent 
to do so, but has on occasion passed such legislation, typically in response to significant 
consumer concerns.  Some examples include Cable Privacy Protection Act of 198487 (a 
user’s cable watching history is private); Video Privacy Protection Act of 198888 (a video 
rental consumer’s rental history is private); Fair Credit Reporting Act89 (consumers may 
correct inaccuracies in credit profiles maintained by reporting agencies); Gramm-Leach-
                                                                                                                                                 
device to detect heat from a private home, to determine whether marijuana was being grown within, 
constituted a search under Fourth Amendment).  In Kyllo, the government contended the device was non-
intrusive and revealed no intimate details because device merely interpreted radiation that emanated from 
the home into public space.  However, the Court stated, “It would be foolish to contend that the degree of 
privacy secured to citizens under the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology . . . .  The question we confront today is what limits are placed upon this technology to limit 
encroachment on the realm of guaranteed privacy.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34. 
81 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
82 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process clauses affect only government actors.  See 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that coerced confession violates due process only if 
coercion is from a state actor);  see also Shimanek, supra note 70, at 469 (noting that Commerce Clause 
protections likely are applicable to the dissemination of information collected). 
83 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
84 See Shimanek, supra note 70, at 466 (“Many individuals erroneously assume that these privacy rights 
extend to almost all aspects of daily life, including commercial activities. . . [but these rights] are only 
applicable when government agents invade an individual’s privacy.”); Cate, supra note 62, at 56 (“The 
government may not unreasonably search and seize and the government may not compel disclosure of 
personal matters in certain circumstances.  The private sector, by contrast, is free to do so, at least from a 
constitutional perspective.”).  
85 But see Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 755-57 (1999) (arguing that 
certain individual liberties must be sacrificed in the name of maintaining societal expectations of privacy). 
86 See Cate, supra note 62, at 36.  But see Whalen v. Roe, 429  U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (upholding New York 
statute requiring physicians to submit prescriptions for abused drugs to a state centralized computer system, 
but recognizing dangers of computer databases to an individual’s right to privacy of personal information); 
see Nelson, supra note 58, at 161 (stating that Whalen highlighted two important points: “facilitation of 
information gathering by technology might necessitate greater Constitutional protections of information 
privacy” and “despite compelling political objectives, personal information must be afforded protections”). 
87 Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified as amended in various sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
88 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (2000). 
89 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). 
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Bliley Financial Services Act of 199990 (financial services customers must be given 
notification of the financial service firm’s privacy policy). 
Interestingly, the United States’ piecemeal approach to federal privacy law contrasts 
the stringent personal data protection adopted by the European Union (EU).91  EU 
member countries’ citizens have a fundamental right to privacy that is more 
encompassing than that of United States’ citizens.92  Since 1998 the EU has regulated 
consumer privacy in its member countries through the European Union’s Council 
Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and the Free Movement of Such Data.93  This directive mandates both statement of the 
purpose of data collection and receipt of consent from the individual, before personally 
identifiable information can be transferred to another party.94  Personally identifiable data 
is any information that can reveal an individual’s identity (including phone number, 
name, address, physical characteristics, email address, Internet cookies, or personal 
identification numbers).95   
 
2.  State Law 
 
Common law tort claims for privacy protection are traced to the seminal 1890 law 
review article by Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.96  Warren and Brandeis 
                                                 
90 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in various sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C. (2000)). 
91 See Nelson, supra note 58, at 158 (“The international trend is to shift responsibility for privacy protection 
to governmental and private entities.  This is different from Constitutional doctrines that are based on an 
expectation of privacy either formed by the individual or defined within the realm of intimate or 
informational decision making.”).  
92 See Francesca Bignami, Privacy and Law Enforcement in the European Union: The Data Retention 
Directive , 8. CHI. J. INT’L L. 233, 233 (2007) (“Data privacy is one of the oldest human rights policies in 
the European Union.”); Scott Rempell, Privacy, Personal Data and Subject Access Rights in the European 
Data Directive and Implementing UK Statute: Durant v. Financial Services Authority as a Paradigm of 
Data Protection Nuances and Emerging Dilemmas, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 807 (2006); Morey Elizabeth 
Barnes, Comment, Falling Short of the Mark: The United States Response to the European Union’s Data 
Privacy Directive, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 171 (2007);  see also David Lindsay, An Exploration of the 
Conceptual Basis of Privacy and the Implications for the Future of Australian Privacy Law, 29 MELB. U. 
L. REV. 131, 134 (2005) (“This article contends that there is a fundamental divergence between the two 
main approaches to privacy within the Western legal tradition, which can be conveniently labeled the 
European approach and the American approach.”).   
93 Council Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31.  European Union member states are: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.  Europa, European Countries, 
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/index_en.htm (last visited October 6, 2008). 
94 Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 93. 
95 Id.  For a discussion of the Directive, see David Church, Recent Developments Regarding U.S. and 
European Union Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 33 INT’L LAW 347 (1999). 
96 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
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introduced the possibility that individuals would have a common law action in state 
courts to protect personal information, particularly about “the private life, habits, acts, 
and relations of an individual.”97  Further developed and defined,98 the four basic kinds of 
privacy rights99 that every individual has against other individuals and entities that are not 
government actors in common law are: 1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of 
another;100 2) appropriation of a person's name or likeness;101 3) publication of private 
facts;102 and 4) publication that places a person in a false light.103  Other claims, including 
negligence claims from the use of privacy-invading technology, are possible under state 
law.104   
State legislatures actively have pursued privacy legislation related to RFID.105  
Initially, model RFID legislation developed by Katherine Albrecht mandated users of 
RFID to declare the presence of the tracking device on the product to which it was 
attached.106  Her bill proposal, The Right to Know Act of 2003107 was a benchmark for 
legislation proposals in California on February 20, 2004,108 in Utah on January 27, 
                                                 
97 Id. at 216. 
98 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).  See also Solove, supra note 54, at 483 
(“Prosser’s great contribution was to synthesize the cases that emerged from Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis’s famous article. . . .  However, Prosser focused only on tort law.”).   
99 For those categorizing privacy beyond the tort law categories, see for example, Ken Gormley, One 
Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335 (1992) (categorizing privacy as tort privacy, Fourth 
Amendment privacy, First Amendment privacy, fundamental-decision privacy, and state constitutional 
privacy); Solove, supra note 54, at 482 (“I aim to develop a taxonomy that focuses more specifically on the 
different kinds of activities that pose privacy problems.”); Westin, supra note 54, at 31-32 (identifying 
“four basic states of individual privacy”). 
100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). 
104 See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1009 (N.H. 2003) (holding that information brokers 
owe a duty of reasonable care); Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 8 N.Y.3d 283, 285 (N.Y. 2007) 
(finding insurance company liable for conversion of computer data by denying an insurance agent access to 
“his customer information and other personal information that was stored on the [company’s] computers.”); 
see also Jennifer E. Smith, Recent Development, You Can Run, But You Can’t Hide: Protecting Privacy 
from Radio Frequency Identification Technology, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 249, 271 (2007) (“In the absence of 
legislation, consumers may yet find recourse via federal or state unfair and deceptive trade practices law.”). 
105 But see Jerry Brito, Relax Don’t Do It: Why RFID Privacy Concerns are Exaggerated and Legislation is 
Premature, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 5, 6 (2004) (“Technologies reliably rouse old privacy concerns.”).  
106 See Mark Baard, Lawmakers Alarmed by RFID Spying, WIRED NEWS,  
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2004/02/62433 (Feb. 26, 2004). 
107 CASPIAN, RFID Right to Know Act of 2003, http://www.nocards.org/rfid/rfidbill.shtml. 
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2004,109 in Missouri on December 1, 2003,110 and in Maryland on January 14, 2004.111  
None of these bill proposals became law; however, state legislative efforts concerning 
RFID continue each year.112 
In 2006, a least 17 states considered RFID legislation.113  The major characteristics of 
the bills concerning the use of RFID were: requiring disclosure of such use, requiring 
removal or deactivation of the RFID device, and prohibiting linking RFID data to 
personal information.114  Other legislation proscribed the use of RFID in certain 
circumstances, such as remotely reading identification documents without the owner’s 
consent;115 including RFID devices in government-issued or mandated identity 
documents;116  and using RFID devices for tracking employees, students, or clients as a 
condition for obtaining benefits or services.117  Of the 17 state legislatures considering 
                                                                                                                                                 
108 S.B. 1834, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). 
109 H.B. 314, 56th Leg., 2004 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2004). 
110 S.B. 867, 92nd Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2004). 
111 H.B. 354, 56th Leg., 2004 Gen. Sess. (Maryland 2004). 
112 National Conference of State Legislatures, 2007 Privacy Legislation Related to Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID),  http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/rfid07.htm (13 states in 2007 considered 
RFID legislation, compared to 17 states in 2006 (2006 Privacy Legislation Related to Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/rfid06.htm ) and 12 states in 2005 (2005 
Privacy Legislation Related to Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/rfid05.htm)).   But see Kristina M. Willingham, Note, Scanning 
Legislative Efforts: Current RFID Legislation Suffers From Misguided Fears, 11 N.C. BANKING INST. 313, 
313 (2007) (“Since much of the legislation reflects exaggerated fears about RFID, increased awareness and 
education about the technology is necessary in order to allay these fears and allow financial institutions the 
opportunity to implement this cost-saving technology.”).  
113 National Conference of State Legislatures, 2006 Privacy Legislation Related to Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/rfid06.htm.  See Laura Hildner, Diffusing 
the Threat of RFID: Protecting Consumer Privacy Through Technology-Specific Legislation at the State 
Level, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 164 (2006) (“A significant benefit of RFID-specific legislation 
would be its consumer education effects.”).  But see Serena G. Stein, Where Will Consumers Find Privacy 
Protection from RFID?  A Case for Federal Legislation, 2007 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3, 22 (2007) (“Since 
RFID technology is used to track inventory nationally and manufacturers supply products to various states, 
regulating at state levels interferes with efficient commerce. This is not an effective way to protect the 
privacy of our nation's citizens or promote economy.”). 
114 Id.  
115 S.B. 682, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).  California leads other states in privacy protection 
legislation.  See, e.g., California Office of Information Security & Privacy Protection, Consumer Privacy, 
http://www.privacy.ca.gov/ (last visited October 1, 2008). 
116 S.B. 2558, 94th Gen. Assem. 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2006) (with an exception for the I-pass system).  
Note that the language of this legislation refers to “contactless integrated circuits” as opposed to RFID 
specifically. 
117 H.B. 7432, 2006 Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2006) (vetoed by Governor June 23, 2006). 
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RFID in 2006, three states adopted RFID provisions: Georgia, New Hampshire and 
Wisconsin.  Georgia and New Hampshire both established study groups to focus on RFID 
technology.118  New Hampshire further enacted a law that prohibited the use of RFID to 
identify occupants of a vehicle or the ownership of a vehicle.119  Wisconsin law 
prohibited requiring an individual to have a microchip implanted.120  North Dakota121 and 
California122 passed bills prohibiting mandatory human microchip implants in 2007.  
These laws would permit voluntary RFID implants. 
Privacy advocates and consumers are expressing concern successfully about privacy 
issues raised by RFID.123  The trend of state laws poses difficulty for businesses wishing 
to implement RFID widely.  A patchwork of varying legal requirements124 significantly 
increases the cost of technological improvement.125 
 
3.  Fair Information Practice Principles 
 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) advocates voluntary guidelines regarding 
information privacy.126  The FIPP guidelines127 are modifications of earlier guidelines 
promulgated by the U. S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare in 1973,128 the 
                                                 
118 H.R. 1558, 2005-2006 Leg. Sess. (Ga. 2006); H.B. 203, 2006 Sess. (N.H. 2006). 
119 H.B. 1738, 2006 Sess. (N.H. 2006). 
120 A.B. 290, 2005 Leg. Sess. (Wis. 2006).   
121 S.B. 2415, 60th Leg. Sess. (N.D. 2007) 
122 S.B. 362, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007) (not yet signed by the Governor).   
123 See, e.g., Katherine Albrecht, Supermarket Cards: The Tip of the Retail Surveillance Iceberg, 79 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 534, 562 (2002). 
124 State constitutions may address privacy along with the common law privacy protections.  See generally 
Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy and the States, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1279 (1992) (discussing 
state privacy laws). 
125 See, e.g., Cate, supra note 62, at 37 (noting that privacy laws emphasizing control of information create  
significant costs without yielding net benefits). 
126 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE IN THE ELECTRONIC 
MARKETPLACE 2 (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf.  See Shimanek, supra 
note 70, at 467 (“Widespread industry resistance to regulatory measures had, until recently, persuaded the 
FTC to adopt a passive approach to ensuring privacy for Internet customers.  The FTC has endorsed 
industry self-regulation as the sole regulatory measure.”). 
127 See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 21. 
128 Incorporated into US law in the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). 
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1980,129 the Canadian 
Standards Association in 1996,130 and others.131  Private corporations are not bound by 
FIPP.132 
Although FIPP is the prevailing emphasis for privacy protection, the privacy law on 
which it is based is littered with exemptions and other weaknesses.133  The crux of its 
protection comes from the notion of an “expectation of privacy”134 and assumes that 
individuals have an adequate understanding of privacy threats when given legal notice of 
the risks (including information collected and how it may be used and disclosed to other 
entities) and the opportunity to consent.135  Legal theories focus on the notice and consent 
issue and attempt to develop and refine the privacy protection achieved through this 
system.136  Just one of the challenges of this system is that the privacy policies can 
                                                 
129 OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA, 
O.E.C.D. Doc. C58 (final)(Oct. 1, 1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
130 MODEL CODE FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION: A NATIONAL STANDARD OF CANADA, 
(1996),  http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/endnotes.htm#N 27. 
131 See William J. Kambas, A Safety Net in the Marketplace: The Safe Harbor Principles Offer 
Comprehensive Privacy Protection Without Stopping Data Flow, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 149, 155 n.27 
(2002). 
132 See John M. Eden, When Big Brother Privatizes:  Commercial Surveillance, the Privacy Act of 1974, 
and the Future of RFID, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 20, 24 (2005) (“[P]rivate corporations are not bound 
by the fair information practices, open-access rules, and data-ownership principles embodied by the 
[Privacy Act of 1974].”). 
133 “Specific exemptions exist for disclosure to agency employees, the Bureau of the Census, the National 
Archives and Records Administration, Congress or its committees, the Comptroller General, and the 
consumer protection agencies. Also exempted is disclosure required under the Freedom of Information Act, 
for statistical research or law enforcement purposes, in response to emergency circumstances, or pursuant 
to court order. Finally, the broadest exemption is for disclosure pursuant to a ‘routine use.’” Nelson, supra 
note 58, at 164 (discussing the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000)) (footnotes omitted).  Nelson 
continues by noting that , even apart from stated exemptions, “requirements of notice and consent are often 
circumvented.” Id. 
134 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (discussing objective expectation of privacy in a 
Fourth Amendment claim); Oleg Kobelev, Recent Development, Big Brother on a Tiny Chip: Ushering in 
the Age of Global Surveillance Through the Use of  Radio Frequency Identification Technology and the 
Need for a Legislative Response, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 325, 333 (2005) (“[T]he Court’s decision has been 
largely limited to the contents of the conversation, rather than giving any meaningful protection from the 
government tracking the physical location of the individual. . . .”).  But see Strahilevitz, supra note 35, at 
933 n.35 (“As a practical matter, however, defendants virtually always claim to have a subjective 
expectation of privacy, and the courts rarely second-guess those representations about the defendant’s state 
of mind.”). 
135 But see Strahilevitz, supra note 35, at 929 n.25 (noting negative externalities associated with voluntary 
disclosure where consent is not obvious). 
136 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 409-21 (1978) (economic 
analysis); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a 
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change at any time if new notice is given.  RFID presents unique information privacy 
issues that current laws do not address adequately.137 
 
 
III. LEGAL PRIVACY THEORIES 
 
The specific concerns raised by privacy-invading technologies like RFID are not 
reflected in current legal theories of privacy.  Economic theory is emphasized in current 
privacy law, but a legal property right in personal information is another theory garnering 
attention.  
 
A. Law and Economics 
 
The traditional legal understanding of privacy focuses on an individual’s expectation 
of privacy, or “the right to be let alone.”138  Economists started applying economic theory 
to the concept of privacy when privacy was defined narrowly as concealing 
information.139  For example, if an individual attempts to conceal personal information 
(e.g., HIV status is not revealed during a job interview), then that concealment retards the 
efficient flow of information.  Early emphasis in economics was that a free flow of 
information achieves the best results in terms of efficient processing and optimal 
benefits.140 
As firms increasingly seek access to personal information, the concept of information 
as a commodity that firms can buy and sell has led legal theorists to rethink the way law 
understands privacy.141  Currently, the emphasis of privacy law for non-governmental 
                                                                                                                                                 
Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1122 (2000) (constitutional 
analysis). 
137 See, e.g., Lars S. Smith, RFID and Other Embedded Technologies:  Who Owns the Technology?, 22 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 695 (2006); D. Zachary Hostetter, When Small Technology is 
a Big Deal: Legal Issues Arising From Business Use of RFID, 2 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 10 (2005). 
138 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 96, at 193. 
139 See Stigler, supra note 26, at 624; see also Posner, supra note 136, at 411-12. 
140 See Staten & Cate, supra note 27, at 746 (maintaining that this free flow still is vital to economic 
efficiency for the “New Economy”).  But see James P. Nehf, Incomparability and the Passive Virtues of Ad 
Hoc Privacy Policy, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 32 (2005) (“We should openly acknowledge that non-
economic values are legitimate in privacy debates, just as they have been recognized in other areas of 
fundamental importance.”). 
141 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 142-63 (1999); Simon G. Davies, 
Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy: How Technology Has Been Transformed from a Right to a 
Commodity, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 143, 160-61 (Philip E. Agre & Marc 
Rotenberg eds. 1997); Symposium, Cyberpersons, Propertization, and Contract in the Information 
Culture:  Propertization, Contract, Competition and Communication, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (2006).  For a 
sampling of those who resist this notion of commodification, see Allen, supra note 85, at 750-57; Cohen, 
supra note 57, at 1423-28; Mark A. Lemley, Private Property: A Comment on Professor Samuelson’s 
Contribution, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1551 (2000). 
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transactions is the concept of notice of intent to collect personal information, along with 
receiving some measure of consent.  Anyone who has signed a privacy notice in a 
doctor’s office recently has experienced this.142  The doctor’s office must prove its 
patients received notice of privacy rights, which it accomplishes by requiring the 
patient’s signature on a form stating the patient has read the notice and agreed to it.143   
Giving consumers greater control over personal information is the focus of the debate 
concerning opt-in versus opt-out rules associated with various consumer protection 
laws.144  Advocates of opt-in rules argue that requiring specific consumer consent for the 
use of personal information encourages informed consent better than requiring specific 
steps to opt-out of the use of personal information.145  Those advocating an opt-out 
system advocate for a free flow of information and a presumption that consumers prefer 
the benefits associated with a free flow of information.146  Those who argue for economic 
efficiency see a requirement for explicit consent as a “drag” on the information flows that 
result in lower costs and benefits specifically targeted to consumers.147 
 
B. Owning Personal Information 
 
A growing number of legal scholars believe a better legal system for protecting an 
individual’s personal information is to treat that information as property.148  Legal 
property rights in personal information such as social security number, consumer 
preferences, and medical history would give individuals control over how that 
information is used.149  Currently, firms that collect personal information (e.g., through a 
shopper loyalty card) have control over the personal information after the individual 
discloses it.150  Therefore, the firm can treat that information, either by itself or in the 
                                                 
142 See Cate, supra note 62, at 38 (“In this situation, a privacy law based on notice and consent imposes 
costs but does little to enhance privacy protection.”). 
143 Id. at 46-53 (evaluating HIPAA legislation).   
144 Federal statutes adopting the opt-out approach include the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in various sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C. (2000)) and the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(e) (2000).  See also Staten & Cate, supra note 27, at 749 n.9 (citing 
examples of federal opt-in legislation introduced in the 107th Congress). 
145 See, e.g., Albrecht, supra note 123, at 560-562.                                 
146 See Cate, supra note 62, at 34 (“These rules ignore much of the evidence about the cost and burden to 
consumers of providing notices and securing consent. . . .”). 
147 See Staten & Cate, supra note 27, at 751- 767 (using specific examples from MBNA information to 
illustrate how opt-in laws “neutralize many of the productivity gains by advances in information 
technology”). 
148 See supra note 141 (listing such scholarship). 
149 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2077-78 (discussing privacy preferences). 
150 Id. at 2059.  See generally id. (focusing on four case studies involving the commodification of personal 
data: the VeriChip, an implantable ID chip; the wOzNet, a wearable ID chip; network computing, such as 
spyware; and compensated telemarketing). 
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aggregate with other shopper loyalty card holders’ information, as an asset to sell to 
interested third parties (e.g., a retail marketing consultant).151  For some card holders, that 
arrangement is acceptable if they receive discounts by using the card.152  Other card 
holders might be less comfortable with such use of their personal information.  Under the 
notice and consent system, individuals’ privacy preferences are not given 
consideration.153  Receiving discounts by using the card requires the individual to give 
full control of their information to the retail firm. 
If an individual owns property, such as manufacturing equipment, then no one else 
can claim an interest or a “right” to that equipment.  All rights associated with that 
property are a part of the property itself.  It is possible to contract with others to use the 
equipment, but that right applies only to those with whom the contract was made and 
only according to the terms of the contract.  The rights to the property are not just about 
control over the property.154  The focus here is more on the concept of property as a 
bundle of sticks.155  Using a single stick in the bundle (such as leasing the equipment to 
another manufacturer) does not eliminate the ability to enjoy other ownership rights 
associated with the equipment (such as valuing it as a firm asset or selling it outright).  
The flexibility of rights in property is important for addressing transactions involving 
personal information.  Information privacy in this context refers to any means (be they 
legal, social norms, or other conditions) that concern transactions of personal 
information.156   
The propertized legal regulation of personal information devised by Professor 
Schwartz contains five elements:  inalienabilities, defaults, right of exit, damages, and 
institutions.157  Per Schwartz, the hybrid inalienability regime arises out of the first 
element of inalienabilities.158  Inalienability concerns restrictions on the transfer, 
ownership, or use of personal information.159  If individuals have a legal property right to 
                                                 
151 A firm’s privacy statement may limit its ability to transfer individual’s information but, typically, these 
privacy statements reserve the right to change the terms.  For the consumer, it is a take-it-or-leave-it 
system.  See Ciocchetti, supra note 77, at 89. 
152 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2077-78 (“Privacy price discrimination therefore requires an increased 
flexibility on the part of those who collect personal information to meet [customers] privacy preferences.”). 
153 Id.  But see Nehf, supra note 140, at 35 (“Preferences on privacy matters are generally muddled, 
incoherent, and ill-informed. If privacy preferences are real but not sufficiently coherent to form a sound 
basis for valuation, any attempt to place a monetary value on them loses meaning.”). 
154 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2094 (rejecting “an unadorned Blackstonian conception in which 
individual control over personal property is an all-or-nothing proposition”). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 2058. 
157 Id. at 2095-2113. 
158 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 
931 (1985). 
159 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2098. 
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personal information, such as their consumer preference information, the law may restrict 
both the use of the information by a firm that collects such information and the firm’s 
ability to transfer the information to a third party (such as a marketing consultant).   
 
1.  Limiting Firms’ Use of Personal Information 
 
Property rights would restriction the free use of personal information, such as for 
those individuals who are happy with the arrangement of receiving discounts in return for 
the personal information collected through the shopper loyalty card.  However, free 
alienability of personal information is not optimal because it does not address the 
problems of market failure in transactions concerning personal information.160  The 
current privacy market includes pervasive failures such that individuals, including those 
who sign up for shopper loyalty cards just to receive discounts, are unaware that 
“negotiating” is taking place in collecting data.161  Most individuals are unaware that their 
consumer patterns are processed by collecting data from each individual use of the 
shopper loyalty card and these data, on its own and combined with other loyalty card 
holders’ data, are sold to third parties.  This asymmetry of information available to all the 
people involved, as well as the systematic disadvantage and relative vulnerability of 
consumers, in the market for personal information requires restrictions on alienability of 
personal information.162  Professor Schwartz notes that one consequence of the market 
failure is that data processing companies that exploit personal information then over-
invest in reaching consumers who do not want to be contacted.163  There is no incentive 
for these companies to invest adequately in technology or services that enhance a 
consumer’s expression of privacy preferences.164 
Similarly, free alienability of personal information does not promote privacy 
commons.165  Many scholars believe that deliberative democracy requires a free exchange 
of personal information through spaces (physical, technological, or otherwise) where 
legal rules and regulation encourage individuals to anonymously and semi-anonymously 
                                                 
160 Id. at 2076-77.  But see Cohen, supra note 57, at 1391 (“Recognizing property rights in personally-
identified data risks enabling more, not less, trade and producing less, not more, rights.”). 
161 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2078; see also Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: 
The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 Wash. L. Rev. 1033, 1074 (1999) (“[S]ellers can be 
expected to exploit consumer ignorance.”). 
162 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2078. 
163 Id. at 2079. 
164 Id. (“Acquisition of personal information at below-market costs also leads companies to underinvest in 
technology or services that can enhance the expression of privacy preferences.”). 
165 See generally Lawrence Lessig, THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001) 
(discussing the ownership of information that results in less opportunity for innovation).  Paul M. Schwartz 
describes the “privacy commons” concept as: “[I]nformational privacy can be seen as a commons that 
requires some degree of social and legal control to construct and then maintain.  The privacy commons is a 
place created through rules for information exchange.” Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2088. 
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share information with no fear of surveillance or unauthorized use of the information.166  
In this view, maintaining individuals’ sense of security in how and where personal 
information is exchanged not only benefits the individual, but has societal benefits of 
promoting open discourse.167 
The hybrid restriction on both the use of personal information, and transfer of the 
information, allows a consumer to transfer personal information only for an initial 
category of use.168  The consumer is required to have the opportunity to block any further 
uses of the information or transfers of the information to unaffiliated firms.169  This 
restriction limits the transfer of personal information because it eliminates the right of a 
consumer to grant permission to a data collector, such as the retailer that provides a 
shopper loyalty card, for all use or transfer of their information in a one-stop information 
consent transaction.170  The advantage to the consumer is that if the data collector wants 
the data for further use or transfer, the collector must seek permission from the consumer, 
thus giving the consumer an opportunity to bargain for the use and transfer of data 
(possibly receiving additional discounts).171 
The use-transferability restriction is designed to limit the negative impact of one-stop 
permission for personal information trade.  The hybrid inalienability regime, however, 
also relies on the use of defaults that safeguard individual choice.172  The regime 
emphasizes the value of an opt-in default173 because it is information-forcing in that the 
data collector, as the most informed participant in the personal information market, is 
forced to inform the individual how the information will be used and to ask permission to 
                                                 
166 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 56, at 1087. 
167 Id. 
168 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2098. 
169 Id. (“The use-transferability restriction runs with the asset; it follows the personal information 
downstream.”). 
170 Certain large data collectors are positioned to utilize data in significant ways.  For example, in 
September 2000, Amazon.com experimented with dynamic-pricing, selling DVD movies to some 
customers for up to 40% less than what they sold the same movie to others based on customer buying 
histories.  David Streitfeld, On the Web Price Tags Blur: What You Pay Could Depend on Who You Are, 
THE WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 27, 2000, at A1 ( “With its detailed records on the buying habits of 23 
millions customers, Amazon.com is perfectly suited to employ dynamic pricing on a massive scale.”).  
When privacy groups learned of the price discrimination and brought media attention to it, Amazon.com 
issued a public apology and made refunds to over 6,500 customers.  Lori Enos, Amazon Apologizes for 
Pricing Blunder,  E-COMMERCE NEWS, Sept. 9, 2000, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/4411.html. 
171 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2098. 
172 Id. at 2100-06. 
173 Compare Staten & Cate, supra, note 27, at 776 (noting that opt-in requirements restricted MBNA ability 
to function efficiently) with Sovern, supra note 161, at 1074 (expressing concern for consumers in opt-out 
regimes).  See also Kristen E. Edmundson, Global Positioning System Implants: Must Consumer Privacy 
Be Lost in Order for People to Be Found?, 38 Ind. L. Rev. 207, 234 (2005) (“Thus, any legislation aimed at 
the privacy of consumers with GPS implants should have an opt-in mechanism.”). 
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do so.174  Hidden information about data processing practices are forced out by the opt-in 
default.  To promote the disclosure of information, participation in the system is 
mandatory, and is enforced by a law barring individuals from bargaining out of the 
system.175  This means that individuals who do not care how their personal information is 
used cannot turn over their right completely; the collector still must contact them for 
every new use of the information or transfer to a third party.176 
 
2.  System for Protecting Individuals 
 
Schwartz conceptualizes the hybrid inalienability regime as promoting bargaining for 
personal information.  However, individuals nonetheless may enter bad bargains despite 
the use-transfer restriction and opt-in default.  In the instance of a bad bargain, 
individuals have a right to exit – and to re-enter – transactions involving their personal 
information.177  This would legally minimize long-term consequences of data 
transactions.178 
Professor Schwartz suggests that laws supporting a property right in personal 
information should include penalties for violations that are not limited to the actual 
damages an individual can prove.179  Damages associated with unauthorized data 
transactions should include a minimal fine because of the recognized impact of privacy 
intrusions on society as a whole.180   
The role of institutions in Professor Schwartz’s system would arise out of three 
functional needs.181  The first is a market-making function that focuses on trading 
mechanisms.  The private sector would address this function adequately.182  The second 
                                                 
174 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2103 (“An opt-in rule forces the data processor to obtain consent to 
acquire, use, and transfer personal information.  It creates an entitlement in personal information and places           
pressure on the data collector to induce the individual to surrender it.”). 
175 Id. (observing that the opt-in regime “also promotes social investment in privacy.”). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 2106. 
178 Id. at 2107. Schwartz recognizes problems with this system.  Id. (“The possible danger of a right to exit, 
however, is that it might actually encourage, rather than discourage, deceptive claims from data collectors.  
The risk is that deceptive information collectors will encourage defections from existing arrangements that 
are privacy-friendly.”). 
179 Id. at 2108-10. 
180 Id. at 2109 (stating that a state determination of damages through legislation is preferable to the 
“Calabresi-Melamed approach” of injunctions). 
181 Id. at 2110 (relating this to the privacy commons discussion) 
182 Id.  But see Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Sept. 1996, at 
99-104 (advocating the establishment of a National Information Market where individuals would establish 
“information accounts”). 
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function of institutions in this system is that of verification.183  One recommendation is 
that decentralized data markets coordinate verification through a separate association.184  
The government would oversee the market of private data transactions also through a 
decentralized system.185  Oversight might include the right for citizens to file lawsuits 
concerning transactions of personal information, as well as privacy laws requiring 
multiple agency oversight.186  One suggestion is for the federal government to create a 
Data Protection Commission to fill a more general oversight role.187  This includes 
helping private entities, advocacy groups, and legislatures to understand the boundaries 
of existing information territories.188 
 
C.  Evaluating Legal Theories 
 
The property right in personal information theory provides crucial lessons that 
supplement our understanding of personal privacy and data collection.189  First, the 
perception is that the law does not adequately protect individuals’ personal information 
and that changes are necessary to address this.190  Second, a property right in personal 
information allows individuals to disclose their information and still retain control over 
it.191  Each transaction by the data collector would require negotiating with individuals.192   
                                                 
183 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification:  The Numerous 
Clauses Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. 373, 384 (2002) (“A verification rule sets 
out the conditions under which a given right in a given asset will run with the asset.”). 
184 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2115. 
185 Id. at 2113 (calling for a mix of public and private action to enforce legal norms). 
186 Id. at 2112. 
187 Id. at 2115 (“In contrast to existing agencies that carry out enforcement actions, such as the FTC, a 
United States Data Protection Commission is needed to fill a more general oversight function.”); see 
generally Benjamin R. Barber, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 310 
(1984) (arguing for expanding the role of ombudsmen in society). 
188 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2115.   
189 Schwartz has applied this property system to specific technology elsewhere.  See, e.g., Paul M. 
Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability and Personal Data Chips, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: 
A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 93, 95 (Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu, eds., 2006); 
Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1269 
(2005).  See also supra note 141. 
190 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 58, at 169 (“Thus, an expectation of privacy cannot serve as a bulwark of 
protection.  When an expectation of privacy cannot be adequately formed or is mistaken as to its power of 
protection, then it does little to afford safeguard privacy.”); Jessica Litman, Information 
Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1313 (2000); Robert C. Post, Book Review, Jeffrey 
Rosen, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2090 (2001).  
191 See generally Lessig, supra note 141, at 142-60. 
192 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2078. 
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This control aspect of the property right is in stark contrast to the free flow of 
information advocated by those who approach the question from a law and economics 
perspective.193  Although there is value to the control sought by private property theorists, 
there are significant costs associated too.194  These costs impede the development of 
technology as well as the operational efficiency the technology can achieve.  Similar to 
how Marks & Spencer’s implementation limited full operational use of the technology, 
the property system discourages the use and development of technological advances. 
However, the current market system for transactions involving personal information 
lacks mechanisms for verification of the information, regulation of its use and security, 
and government oversight.195  Benefits achieved through the free flow of information are 
not significant enough to ignore the risks and costs associated with the lack of privacy 
rights achieved by individuals in this system.   
We argue that current legal theories do not adequately represent the privacy research 
in other academic disciplines.196  The legal discussion must not exist in a vacuum but 
incorporate important insights from economic, behavioral, and sociological research.  
Understanding fully the issue of individual privacy advances the opportunity to develop a 
sustainable legal model of privacy. 
 
 
IV. THEORETICAL LENSES 
 
We introduce three theories to expand and advance the discussion of legal privacy 
rights.197  We sampled quite diverse fields within the social sciences, as well as  multiple 
theories within each discipline, before settling on these three.  It is beyond the scope and 
intent of this paper to summarize all the privacy-related literature in any given discipline; 
rather, we chose one theoretical approach from each discipline.  We also settled on this 
particular set of theories for specific reasons.  Each theory provides meaningful lessons 
about privacy that arise because of the distinctive focus of the given discipline.  
Collectively the theories span a wide range of social science disciplines, providing 
different perspectives and contrasts.  Finally, these theories, although from quite different 
disciplines, have relevant synergies and salient commonalties.198  In all we believe these 
theories have great potential for developing a new understanding of privacy law. 
 
                                                 
193 See Cate, supra note 62, at 37; Posner, supra note 136, at 394-96. 
194 See Staten & Cate, supra note 27, at 776. 
195 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2128 (“[O]ngoing scrutiny of regulation of personal data is needed 
because failure on the privacy market can harm both individual self-determination and democratic 
deliberation.”). 
196 Some notable exceptions are highlighted in note 38 supra. 
197 See infra Part IV.A. (behavioral economics); Part IV.B. (Communication Privacy Management); Part 
IV.C. (social network theory).  
198 See infra Part V. (An Integrative Privacy Approach). 
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A. Behavioral Economics 
 
As technology has progressed rapidly to impact how personal information is 
collected, processed, and stored, economic analysis also has developed to reach a broader 
understanding of privacy and its implications.199  Then economic theory began to 
incorporate considerations of technologies that allow allowing greater protection of 
personal information (such as encryption technology).200  Economic theory also began to 
consider the role of third party purchasers who create secondary markets in personal 
information.201  Most recently, some economists have applied behavioral economics to 
better explain and understand how individuals make decisions about their personal 
information in the context of technology.202  This lens offers a framework for 
understanding why the actions of individuals – even those with complete information – 
are affected by the economics of immediate gratification.203 
Behavioral economists now posit that individuals may not be able to act economically 
rational when considering their personal privacy options.204  Traditional economics 
maintained that individuals are forward-looking and when making decisions about their 
own personal information, they can take into account their future preferences.205  In other 
words, individuals can value their personal information in the long-term and make 
decisions based on the value they associate with the information.206  They will reveal the 
information to those willing to exchange it for something of equal or greater value, 
including discounts on products or faster service.  Recent experiments, however, indicate 
that individuals do not value their personal information adequately.207  In one case, those 
                                                 
199 See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein &Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1471 (1998). 
200 Eli M. Noam, Privacy and Self-Regulation: Markets for Electronic Privacy, in U.S. DEPT. OF 
COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1997), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfreg1.htm#1B.. 
201 Hal R. Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, in U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND 
SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1997). 
202 See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy Behavior: Losses, 
Gains, and Hyperbolic Discounting, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY, 165-78 (Jean Camp & 
Stephen Lewis eds., 2004);  Sarah Spiekermann, Jens Grossklags & Bettina Berendt, E-privacy in 2nd 
Generation E-commerce: Privacy Preferences Versus Actual Behavior, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM 
CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 38-47 (2001). 
203 See Acquisti, supra note 28, at 22-27.  
204 See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality: Theory and Evidence, in PRIVACY 
AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 15-29 (Katherine Strandburg & 
Daniela Stan Raicu, eds., 2006).  
205 See Acquisti, supra note 28, at 22. 
206 Id. at 23 (showing this as an equation). 
207 Id. 
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individuals who identified themselves as valuing privacy highly nonetheless exchanged 
information for small rewards.208 
Part of the explanation for why individuals do not value their personal information 
consistent with their own privacy preferences is that privacy itself is an ever-growing 
concept.  It is better considered as a class of interests rather than a single monolith.209  
Information advances have blurred the lines between public and personal information and 
technology has changed the way individuals interact with personal information.210  
Consider the increasing popularity of on-line dating services.  A process that in the recent 
past was considered private and personal now engages individuals willing to disclose 
their personal information for others to read in a very public way.211 
   
1.  Impeding Rational Privacy Decisions 
 
One of the issues individuals face when they attempt to manage the trade-offs 
between protecting personal information (e.g., using encryption technology or an 
anonymous email service) and declining such protection is incomplete information.212  
Asymmetric information is a factor in many economic transactions.213  In particular, 
incomplete information affects individuals’ ability to measure the costs and benefits of 
these transactions.  Costs include both monetary as well as  nonmonetary costs.  
Everything from the cost of identity theft to the cost of employing technology to protect 
data involves specific monetary outlays.214  Nonmonetary costs might include the effort 
                                                 
208 See Spiekermann et. al., supra note 202, at 40. 
209 See Acquisti, supra note 28, at 23; see also supra Part II.B. (discussing privacy definitions and 
concepts). 
210 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Social Norms, Self Control, and Privacy in the Online World, in PRIVACY 
AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 36 (Katherine Strandburg & 
Daniela Stan Raicu, eds., 2006) (“[T]he study may provide evidence that the inconsistency between 
individuals’ stated attitudes about disclosing personal information and their behavior is a result of struggles 
pitting long term desires for privacy against short term temptations to disclose information in exchange for 
relatively minor, but immediately attractive, savings or conveniences.”).  
211 Id. (“‘Taste from disclosure’ may result in less inhibition and looking out for one’s own good.”).  
Another example is the explosion of popularity of the web site www.myspace.com where younger people 
share personal information that an older generation would never dream of disclosing, see, e.g., Teachers 
Warned About MySpace Profiles, ESCHOOL NEWS, Nov. 19, 2007, http://www.eschoolnews.com/news/top-
news/index.cfm?i=50557 (noting an investigation of public school teachers’ postings on MySpace that 
included messages about drug use and sexual exploits while sometimes listing students as MySpace 
friends).  
212 See Acquisti, supra note 28, at 24. 
213 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2080 (discussing the problem of information asymmetries as a 
motivation for his information as property regime); see generally H. Jeff Smith, MANAGING PRIVACY: 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CORPORATE AMERICA 95-138 (1994) (studying the inconsistent 
enforcement of corporate privacy policies). 
214 See Acquisti, supra note 28, at 24. 
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to identify the best technologies to protect data, anxiety over loss of control over private 
information, or the inability to interact fully in an on-line community because of a 
personal privacy preference.  The identified benefits likewise are monetary (discounts to 
consumers willing to share personal information) or intangible (satisfaction with using 
encryption technology).  Although important, it is very difficult to quantify the value of 
these costs or benefits until after a privacy intrusion such as identity theft.215 
In a dynamic environment of changing technologies and new uses for personal 
information, individuals must deal with incomplete information about the probability 
distribution of future events.216  If an individual knew with any certainty that entering a 
credit card number in a database today would result in identity theft in the next four to six 
years then that individual could perform a rational cost-benefit analysis, which would 
include considerations of completing a transaction quickly without waiting on hold for a 
customer service representative, canceling the credit card in the next year and switching 
to a new credit card company, and any future discounts from the store for revealing this 
personal information.  However, knowing these future events with any certainty is 
impossible.217 
Thus, individuals must make decisions about revealing personal information while 
limited by bounded rationality.218  Individuals cannot make rational economic trade-off 
calculations because, once personal information is revealed, the individual has lost all 
control over it.219  The personal information may be forwarded to third parties, 
aggregated with other individuals’ personal information, and otherwise processed, 
manipulated, and exchanged in unpredictable ways (because some uses of this 
information are not even discovered yet) and without limit in time.220  Not knowing key 
pieces of information, such as which firms are interested in purchasing personal 
information and to what ends, disadvantages an individual so that rational evaluation of 
personal information-revealing strategies is impossible.  RFID technology and its ability 
to gather vast amounts of personal data contribute to an individual’s inability to make 
rational privacy decisions.221 
                                                 
215 Id. (“It is difficult for an individual to estimate all these values.  Through information technology, 
privacy invasions can be ubiquitous and invisible.  Many of the payoffs associated with privacy protections 
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Tatikonda & Ying Liao, A Behavioral Study of Supply Manager Decision-Making, 24 J. OPERATIONS 
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217 See Acquisti, supra note 28, at 24. 
218 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2081 (“Behavioral economics scholarship has demonstrated that 
consumers’ general inertia toward default terms is a strong and pervasive limitation on free choice.”).   
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221 See supra Part II.A. 
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2.  Human Tendencies Impact Privacy 
 
Lack of information and the ability to evaluate it fully are not the only factors 
hampering an individual in devising a rational strategy for personal information 
disclosure.  Psychological distortions impact individual strategy, including hyperbolic 
discounting, under insurance, self-control problems, and immediate gratification.222  
Hyperbolic discounting refers to the tendency of individuals to apply a different discount 
rate to events that will happen soon than to events in the future.223  Even if a high risk 
exists in the future of a loss of personal information through a security breach, 
individuals may not factor that risk into their strategy the same as they would a loss of 
personal information next week.224  Compounding individuals’ tendency not to discount 
future risks consistent with short term risks is their tendency to underinsure against 
risks.225 
The nature of revealing personal information creates other psychological problems for 
the individual.  It is rare that an individual is willing to turn over every piece of personal 
information all at once.  Instead, the nature of requests for various small pieces of 
information (e.g., grocery shopping practices) seems innocuous and a small price to pay 
in return for discounts on grocery items.  Each small piece of information remains 
available for long periods of time.226  Therefore, even if an individual is only willing to 
reveal small innocuous pieces of information, these pieces released to various sources 
accumulate and congregate in the personal information market.227  The time 
inconsistency involved in revealing information makes it difficult for individuals to judge 
the potential costs.228 
An individual’s inclination toward immediate gratification is exacerbated when the 
issue is privacy.229  Loss of privacy usually is not felt immediately after revealing 
                                                 
222 See Acquisti, supra note 28, at 25. 
223 Matthew Rabin & Ted O’Donoghue, The Economics of Immediate Gratification, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION 
MAKING 233, 240 (2000). 
224 Id. 
225 See Acquisti, supra note 28, at 25. 
226 See Strandburg, supra note 210, at 44 (“This widespread and rapid dissemination makes it difficult, if 
not impossible, for individuals to make rational predictions of the costs and benefits of each disclosure.”). 
227 See Acquisti, supra note 28, at 27 (“This dynamic captures the essence of privacy and the so-called 
anonymity sets, where each bit of information we reveal can be linked to others, so that the whole is more 
than the sum of the parts.”); Cohen, supra note 57, at 1425 (data collection poses risks to autonomy 
because the “picture” that develops of an individual – over time – is in many respects more detailed than a 
visual observation of the individual, because patterns and preferences may be discerned). 
228 See Acquisti, supra note 28, at 27. 
229 Id. (“Individuals may tend to downplay the fact that single actions present low risks, but their repetition 
forms a huge liability:  it is a deceiving aspect of privacy that its value is truly appreciated only after 
privacy itself is lost.”). 
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information but the benefits from revealing small pieces of information may be received 
immediately, such as when you are asked to complete a survey to receive a coupon for a 
useful product or service.  It is only when a future risk is realized, and the full effect of 
the loss of privacy is felt, that individuals can value privacy appropriately.  For instance, 
when a routine search of a credit report reveals identity theft that requires canceling credit 
cards and re-establishing credit over a long period of time, the individual can appreciate 
the value of privacy.  Until then, immediate gratification tendencies focus on short term 
results.230 
Those individuals sophisticated enough to understand the self-control problems 
associated with immediate benefits could take steps to incorporate their awareness of 
these risks into their decision making process about revealing personal information.231  
An individual might think to himself, “Although I want to receive a discount for services 
at my favorite car detailer, to do so would require releasing my preferences, along with 
my credit card number and my home and email addresses.  This information, if made 
available widely, will expose me to junk mail, spam email, and potential identity theft.  
The discount is not worth the risk.”  Studies suggest, however, that even the sophisticated 
individual does not engage in this type of analysis.  In a counter-intuitive twist, knowing 
the risks may actually decrease an individual’s incentive to reveal less information.232  
With the knowledge that complete protection from all future privacy intrusions is not 
possible, sophisticated individuals choose to reveal information now in order to obtain 
the greatest benefit immediately.233  It is as if they think to themselves, “I will not get the 
discount unless I reveal the information, and it is inevitable there is personal information 
about me available to others.”  
This analysis in economic theory concludes that simply giving individuals as much 
knowledge as possible to help them analyze the cost and benefit trade-offs in privacy may 
not promote rational economic behavior.234  Instead, rational privacy behavior is 
impossible, given individuals’ incomplete information, the problem of bounded 
rationality, and a variety of psychological distortions.  Improved individual awareness of 
the problem and adopting self-protection through better technologies will not resolve all 
the psychological issues that are factored into privacy decisions.  Policies to regulate the 
collection and use of personal information may be necessary to increase privacy-related 
welfare.235  Self-regulation by data collectors using RFID technology necessarily would 
include policies that regulate the collection and use of personal information. 
                                                 
230 See Rabin & O’Donoghue, supra note 223, at 233. 
231 See Acquisti, supra note 28, at 28. 
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This behavioral economics framework provides important insights concerning the 
evolution of economics and privacy, including that individuals cannot act economically 
rational when making decisions about personal information.  Although classical 
economic analysis perceived a request for information as a trade-off that individuals 
accept or reject based on their own preferences and valuations,236 behavioral theory 
unequivocally demonstrates that is not the case.  Second, transactions in privacy, 
although affected by typical economic factors such as incomplete information, are 
uniquely impacted by human psychological tendencies.237  Taking steps to increase 
awareness of costs and benefits will not resolve sufficiently these tendencies.  Third, 
some economists are calling for regulation to prevent the costs of privacy from 
increasing.  RFID technology permits vast data collection, re-use and transfer.  The legal 
understanding of privacy should consider this research, which indicates the faulty basis of 
notice and consent in this context. 
 
B. Communication Privacy Management 
 
Communication Privacy Management (CPM), a theory from the behavioral 
communications discipline, provides rules for coordinating disclosure of personal 
information.238  This lens offers an important framework for understanding individuals’ 
decisions to disclose personal information.239  CPM focuses on the fact that privacy and 
disclosure are not mutually exclusive.  Disclosing information involves agreeing to 
coordinate with the discloser about how this information is used.240  Disclosure, then, is 
not the same as turning over control of information to the recipient.241  Communication in 
any form is not about imparting information but rather entering a relationship as a co-
manager of the information with others.242   
 
1.  Coordinating Privacy and Disclosure  
                                                 
236 See Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 
Geo. L.J. 2381, 2382 (1996); Posner, supra note 69, at 409; Strandburg, supra note 210, at 38 (“[I]n grossly 
oversimplified terms, the consensus of the law and economics literature is this: more information in the 
name of privacy is better, and restrictions in the flow of information in the name of privacy are generally 
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In social settings, communicating information is necessary for any number of reasons 
-- to get to know someone better, to function in a group, or to gain more information—
but, according to CPM, the communication is not a one-time effort because individuals 
expect to retain the right to decide how their own information is used in the future.243  
Communication is a bond formed to manage the information appropriately.244  For 
example, when someone asks you to serve as a reference for a position in a new 
company, you know intuitively that you do not have permission to inform the current 
boss of the discloser that she is hoping to receive a job offer from a new company.  
Rather, you understand that  you must wait to tell others about the job possibility – 
particularly people who might tell the discloser’s boss—until given permission or a 
general announcement is made. 
Communication begins with personal information contained within boundaries.245  
Disclosure results in boundaries overlapping with other individuals’ boundaries.246  
Disclosure creates various boundary overlaps but CPM emphasizes that the boundaries 
themselves are not erased.  Instead, individuals must manage a multitude of information 
with different degrees of control, depending on the nature of the information 
communicated.247 
 
2.  Rules for Managing Privacy 
 
CPM explains the rules individuals must use to manage the boundaries of 
communications.  These rules focus on the amount of access to personal information 
intended by its communication and how the bond formed by the communication is 
coordinated.  Rules are developed based on five decisional criteria:  cultural norms into 
which people are socialized,248 gendered differences (similar to cultural socialization but 
gender related), motivations for disclosure (encompassing a variety of factors), context of 
the disclosure (both in terms of social environment and physical setting), and risk-benefit 
analysis.249  Rules are formulated based on the five decisional criteria but are further 
refined.   
                                                 
243 See Leslie A. Baxter & Barbara M. Montgomery, RELATING: DIALOGUES AND DIALECTICS 178-181 
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244 See Petronio, supra note 33, at 111. 
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 The first refinement concerns the manner in which individuals acquire rules.250  
Usually, individuals learn rules concerning communication management through 
socialization in a family or within a group or through negotiations about who is included 
in the communication.  As time passes, rules are refined through experience, events, or 
other factors that help an individual manage all the personal information disclosures.251  
New situations may trigger new rules or changes in existing rules.252  As co-owners of 
information negotiate their shared boundaries, positive or negative sanctions might 
reinforce the group privacy management rules.253 
 
3.  Clashes Over Privacy 
 
CPM recognizes that the rules concerning managing the communication of personal 
information are not followed by everyone all the time.  When clashes result from failure 
to manage information well there is “boundary turbulence.”254  Although turbulence 
might happen for a variety of reasons, our particular focus is when turbulence results 
from fuzzy boundaries.   
Fuzzy boundaries occur when ownership of information is not defined clearly.255  
Technology may contribute to ownership confusion because it allows individuals to 
access personal information more readily than in the past.256  However, access to personal 
information does not mean the unrestricted control of that information.  CPM maintains 
that ownership of personal information is not wholly transferred through disclosure.  
Technology also causes an incongruity of access.257  Privacy concerns occur when 
individuals believe that the use of their personal information does not follow established 
rules.    
CPM addresses a fundamental issue of privacy: disclosure of personal information.  
The rules of communication require coordinating the dissemination of personal 
information after it is disclosed.  Receiving information and taking full control of it 
without coordinating its maintenance within shared boundaries is not expected or 
understood and causes turbulence in the system.  Nonetheless, data collected by RFID, 
including personal information, become wholly owned by the collector.  CPM research 
indicates this is not typically the intent of those who agree to share such information, 
raising questions concerning notice and consent. 
                                                 
250 Id. at 71-72. 
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C. Social Network Theory
Social network theory contends that individuals are embedded in social relationships
that in general can be characterized by either strong ties or weak ties.258  Relationships 
characterized by strong ties are with people with whom we regularly share information, 
swap office gossip, eat meals, and so on.259  Weak ties refer to other people that we know 
and recognize, with whom we exchange pleasantries and with whom we might exchange 
an occasional greeting card.260  Recently, businesses have begun mapping these 
relationships in order better understand how information really flows within and across 
firms.261  The result of the mapping can be very different from the relationships depicted 
on a typical organization chart. 
1. Personal Information Connections
Mark Granovetter had a number of breakthrough observations concerning social
networks.262  One of his key observations was that most of the people with whom we 
have strong ties also have strong ties with each other.  This is the group with whom an 
individual tends to form a social circle.  Individuals within a social circle may share last 
names, employers, club memberships, neighborhoods, or alumni connections.  The key 
point is that, in such a group, individuals all tend to have strong ties to each other.  The 
connections within this network are dense and the networks are highly transitive.  As a 
result no single individual is critical to this network.  That is, the removal of any one 
individual will have minimal impact on the communications patterns within the 
network.263 
On the other hand, weak ties are those ties to people outside of the individual’s 
immediate social circle.  People with whom a given individual has weak ties generally 
will not have ties to people within the individual’s circle of strong ties.  Weak ties thus 
serve a bridging function.264  The absence of a weak tie between two groups, each closely 
258 See Strahilevitz, supra note 35, at 953-58. 
259 See John Scott, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 32 (2000). 
260 Id.  See also Gabriel Weimann, The Strength of Weak Conversational Ties in the Flow of Information 
and Influence, 5 SOC. NETWORKS 245, 246 (1983). 
261 The Office Chart That Really Counts, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (2006),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_09/b3973083.htm.  See also Gregory N. Stock & 
Mohan V. Tatikonda, External Technology Integration, 26 J. OPERATIONS MGMT. 65-80 (2008) (discussing 
information and technology flows within and across firms). 
262 Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 1 SOC. THEORY 201 (1983). 
263 Id. at 201-02.  
264 Id. at 205. 
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knit, will all but eliminate the possibility of communications between these groups.  In 
other words, there is no bridge to cross over the structural hole.265 
Social networks tend to be scale-free or “power-law” networks.266  That is, 
connections are far from uniformly distributed throughout the network.  Instead, the vast 
majority of individuals are relatively isolated.  However, there are a few individuals who 
are highly connected, often through multiple weak ties.  These are often called hubs or 
super-nodes.267  Information that becomes system-wide thus must flow through these 
super-nodes.   The Kevin Bacon game is a popular culture means of examining the 
function of super-nodes.  Connecting the movie actor Kevin Bacon to another movie 
actor through the fewest number of links as possible (the links in the game typically are 
movies) demonstrates how one well-connected movie actor can connect to other movie 
actors, including those who are isolated (in terms of movie actor status) and remain on 
the periphery.268  Connections between individuals is a dynamic process, because new 
connections are made while others weaken or disappear through geographic constraints, 
death, change in interests, or any number of other factors.269 
 
2.  Predicting Information Flow 
 
Social network theory means any single piece of personal information potentially can 
spread around the world.  However, if individuals become highly concerned about that 
potential for wide-spread dissemination, they might tend to keep their personal 
information more closely held then necessary.270  The reality is that most networks have 
“structural holes” (disconnect between the nodes) and, therefore, disclosing personal 
information within such a network raises little concern that information will diffuse 
widely within that social network.271  Virtually the only way that personal information 
can become public information is if it flows through one or more super-nodes and the 
information is interesting or valuable enough for wide dissemination.  Thus, it is 
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important to evaluate network structure and cultural barriers to determine the extent to 
which information will flow through the network.272 
Not all networks are created equal.  The structure of each network can vary 
immensely, depending on such factors as the number of super-nodes within the network 
and prevalence of ties within the network.  Information is diffused more rapidly through 
weak ties than strong ties.  Therefore the prevalence of weak ties between super-nodes 
would aid in rapid dissemination of information.  The concern about diffusing 
information this way, however, is that the information tends to be less accurate and 
credible than information transmitted through strong ties.  In addition information that 
needs to be aggregated for the most useful result may be most effective when transmitted 
through strong ties.  Information flows most efficiently through a high number of active 
linkages, but when trying to conceal information (e.g., a new business strategy) the 
network becomes much smaller and only the strong ties remain active.  Therefore, 
although linkages might help information flow efficiently, social network theory does not 
demand that inevitably the information will flow throughout an individual’s network.  
Limiting information flow may be necessary for a variety of cultural reasons as well 
as strategic considerations.273  Obviously, if accounting tricks are employed to help a 
firm’s bottom line, pragmatic concerns require selective disclosure of the information, 
most likely to those individuals who are implicated in the activity so that reciprocity will 
keep the information contained.  Another concern limiting information flow is the 
concern that the information will not reflect the original communication after several 
disclosures.  Information tends to degrade as it is transmitted.274  In other words, not 
everyone passes information along to the extent they could based on their ties.  Studies 
suggest that people will pass the information on to others to the extent they believe the 
information is credible, interesting, and not redundant.275  Opportunity costs also may be 
a factor.   
In addition to these factors, another critical aspect of privacy involves the content of 
the information, whether or not a given piece of information is interesting.276  Interesting 
information (e.g., an extra-marital affair) will tend to spread quickly within a network of 
people who share strong ties.  Strong ties indicate each individual knows the people 
involved and, therefore, the information is of particular relevance for all.277  However, 
such information has very little currency to someone linked with only a weak tie.  Gossip 
about someone you do not know is not that interesting. 
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Thus, people reasonably may expect personal information shared only by people 
within their social network (both strong and weak tie) to remain private.  Although such 
networks may be well in excess of 1000 people,278 social network theory suggests that 
most information about non-public figures would remain confined to the network 
participants, and would not jump the gap to public knowledge.  All such information 
remains inherently private because it is known only within the expected group. 
The increased prevalence of technology may defy the expectations of privacy related 
to word-of-mouth communication.  We all have experienced reading the same story 
through emails sent from various sources.  Rapid diffusion technologies (such as email, 
text-messages, facebook.com, or blogging) may decrease the opportunity cost of 
disseminating information, even if it is about people we do not know.  This cultural 
change impacts the flow of information and may expand networks.279 
The social network theory highlights key privacy insights.  First, there is a predictable 
network within which personal information is disclosed.  The disclosure is based on 
cultural and strategic considerations.  Second, how information is disseminated is 
explained through the strong and weak ties established within networks.  Finally, an 
individual who discloses personal information within a network still expects that the 
information will remain private and be kept within a controlled group.  Social network 
theory finds that personal information in all likelihood will not jump gaps between 
networks with any regularity.  Data collectors using RFID can re-use and manipulate 
such data in ways that defy individuals’ expectations described in social network theory. 
When information flows in unexpected ways it challenges whether consent to data 
collection is valid.  
 
 
V.  AN INTEGRATIVE PRIVACY APPROACH 
 
Regulation of personal information acquired by private entities is largely based on the 
cornerstone principles of FIPP, notice and consent.280  The notice and consent construct 
assumes that individuals reveal personal information and do not intend to retain some 
level of control over it.  All of the theories presented speak to the problem of ownership 
of personal information.  These theories from different academic perspectives agree that 
the idea of giving consumers notice about the use of their personal information, and 
obtaining their consent to the immediate use as well as any future use, does not 
adequately address individuals’ privacy expectations.  The theories demonstrate that 
notice does not equal awareness, and that choice does not equal informed consent.   
The three other FIPP tenets of “access,” “security,” and “enforcement” are addressed 
in these theories as well.  Recent economic theory advances the ideas of privacy 
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regulation.281  CPM and the social networks theories similarly recognize that advancing 
technology affects individuals’ privacy uniquely.282  The limitations of FIPP, and even 
the current relative under-utilization of FIPP tenets by businesses, increase the likelihood 
of government regulation that could increase technology costs and diminish its practical 
benefits.  FIPP is not without value and represents a practical response to information 
gathering.  However well intentioned, FIPP lacks the strong theoretical basis needed to 
address the complexities of data collection in the era of modern technology such as 
RFID.  Given this, we offer theoretical research to fashion a more robust model of control 
and dissemination of personal information. 
Industry self-regulation that considers both the on-going interest of individuals and 
their personal information, and the needs of industry to operate efficiently and 
effectively, is preferable to piecemeal government regulation.  For technology to thrive, 
the legal model must address the growing issue of personal privacy threats without 
impinging on business advances.  The primary intent of this research was to frame the 
privacy aspects of indiscriminate data collecting technology such as RFID through 
theoretical lenses to broaden the discussion of privacy and its legal implications.  We 
summarize our findings by concluding that an effective self-regulation system must first 
recognize three principles that we identify as the Integrative Considerations.  Integrative 
Considerations are prevalent in research concerning privacy but utterly lacking in law and 
policy models for promiscuous technology such as RFID.   
 
A.  Integrative Considerations 
 
1. The All-or-Nothing Fallacy 
 
First, individuals expect to own, control, and share personal information even after 
disclosing it.  In contrast, the law traditionally understands private information as an asset 
of the firms to which it is disclosed.283   Even if an “opt-in” system is utilized, which 
allows for specific consumer consent for the use of personal information, firms assume 
full control of information after consent is demonstrated through opting-in.284  Any 
privacy protection offered by collecting firms typically reserves the right to change the 
protections based on the firms’ needs.285  Assuming full control of personal information 
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285 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2059.  Most credit card owners receive updates to privacy statements on 
a regular basis.  Some businesses put the onus on the consumer to check a website regularly for updates.  
For example: 
The terms of this policy will govern the use and any information collected while it is in place. 
SEL reserves the right to change this policy at any time, so please re-visit this page as often as 
you wish. In case of any material change, we will change the "Last Update Date" in this 
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disclosed, either by itself or in the aggregate with other disclosed information, as an asset 
of the firm fails to consider individuals’ expectations concerning personal information.  
Individuals intend to share information.  All-or-nothing is a fallacy. 
An all-or-nothing approach to disclosure of personal information impedes the ability 
of individuals to make rational economic trade-off calculations about whether to reveal 
personal information.286  Individuals lack key pieces of information because firms treat 
the personal information as an asset with infinite number of uses now and in the future.287  
CPM emphasizes that individuals’ expectation is to coordinate use of personal 
information after it is disclosed.288  Information remains within individuals’ boundaries, 
even after it overlaps with the recipients’ boundaries.  Coordination requires much more 
than notices that firms have changed their privacy policy.289 Social network theory 
implies that coordination involves dissemination of the personal information only within 
the reasonable networks expected and anticipated by the discloser.290  Firms that receive 
personal information do not have full control of that information.  Instead, individuals 
remain the primary owners of their information. 
 
2. Technology as a Rationality-Dampening Influence 
 
Notice and consent as a foundation of privacy law fails to address the reality of 
advancing technologies.291  RFID and the vast reach of similar technologies do not permit 
individuals to understand fully privacy implications of disclosure and to evaluate 
effectively the opportunity prior to consent.292   
There is more at work here than simply a lack of adequate explanation when given 
notice about an RFID device collecting information.  Studies show that even 
sophisticated individuals fail to calculate the risk effectively prior to consent.293  Rather, 
                                                                                                                                                 
privacy policy and/or post a notice on the site. Changes to this privacy policy are effective as 
of the stated "Last Update Date" and your continued use of this site on or after the "Last 
Update Date" will constitute acceptance of, and agreement to be bound by, those changes. 
Sony Electronics, Inc. Privacy Policy, available at 
http://products.sel.sony.com/SEL/legal/privacy.html (last visited October 1, 2008). 
286 See Acquisti, supra note 28, at 24-25. 
287 See Nehf, supra note 140, at 20-21 (describing DoubleClick’s plan to merge data collected online with 
consumer residence information obtained from a database it acquired). 
288 See Petronio, supra note 33, at 88-90. 
289 See supra note 285. 
290 See Strahilevitz, supra note 35, at 953-958. 
291 See supra notes 133-35 and text accompanying. 
292 See Nehf, supra note 140, at 19 (noting weak market incentives for evaluating personal information 
prior to disclosure). 
293 See supra notes 231-33 and text accompanying. 
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in the face of privacy-invading technology such as RFID, individuals tend to reveal 
more.294  This is not solely the result of lack of transparency about the process of 
collecting information, but a combination of factors that cause individuals essentially to 
give up trying.  Given the growing prevalence of privacy invading devices, individuals 
have succumbed to a sort of inevitability about disclosures.295   
This rationality-dampening influence of advancing technologies that significantly 
challenges individuals’ comprehension of the use of their personal information is not a 
positive result for firms.  The predictability of boundaries and social networks provided a 
basis for regulation through notice and consent.   Now, technologies require firms to 
assume more of the burden of protecting individuals’ personal information.  
 
3. The Vast Reach of the Secondary Market 
 
We all expect firms to disseminate information we reveal to a certain extent.  A 
retailer may have customers that are happy to offer personal identity information in return 
for a store credit card or email communication about discount offers.  Behavioral and 
sociological research offers insights concerning how individuals expect the dissemination 
of such information.  However, a significant threat to personal privacy arises not from the 
initial disclosure of personal information but more problematically from the subsequent 
re-use, transfer to third parties, and aggregation of that information.296   
The market for personal information is vast.297  Subsequent re-use of information is 
particularly troublesome because individuals have lost all control of the information.298  
Individuals are not able to make informed decisions about disclosure.299  But each of 
these uninformed decisions that reveals relatively small amounts of personal information 
permits, over time, a detailed picture of an individual to develop.300   These disclosures 
have no adequate verification system so the accuracy of that picture is questionable.  
Information tends to degrade as it is transmitted.301  Nonetheless firms engage in buying 
and selling on a vast secondary market with no regard for the personal privacy 
implications.  
                                                 
294 See supra notes 232-33 and text accompanying. 
295 See Acquisti, supra note 28, at 28 (concluding that individuals cannot make the best decisions 
concerning privacy for themselves). 
296 See also Nehf, supra note 140, at 22 (“It is difficult enough to value information when we know about a 
single user's intended purpose. It is impossible to value when the ultimate destination, aggregation, and use 
of the information are unknowable.”) 
297 See supra note 8. 
298 But see Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2098 (proposing a system that requires a data collector to negotiate 
further use of transfer of data). 
299 See Strandburg, supra note 210, at 44. 
300 See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
301 See Strahilevitz, supra note 35, at 971. 
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B. Applying Integrative Considerations to RFID  
 
Incorporating these integrative considerations into the discussion of RFID and 
privacy standards will advance efficiency and effectiveness through technology 
applications while at the same time advancing legal models beyond a narrow 
understanding of privacy.302   Users interested in the vast capabilities of RFID devices 
should adopt policies that recognize that:  1) individuals expect to own, control, and share 
personal information, even after disclosing it;  2) advancing technologies raise concerns 
about bounded rationality and ineffective analysis of the costs and benefits of disclosing 
personal information; and 3) the significant threat to personal privacy comes not from the 
initial disclosure of personal information but from the subsequent re-use, transfer to third 
parties, and aggregation of that information.   
A secondary intent of our research is to begin the discussion of potential solutions to 
managing private data obtained through RFID technology, using the three policy 
considerations derived from the Integrative Considerations.   We offer three specific 
initial goals for self-regulation of RFID devices: limiting the types of information 
gathered, setting a timeline for expiration of this information, and protecting the 
information from re-use and transfer.  None of these goals are unique and many 
businesses currently regulate their data collection using one or more of these goals.  
However, using these three goals in tandem with an understanding of the Integrative 
Considerations will result in the best RFID privacy policy. In particular, businesses’ data 
retention policies should include carefully rationalized data expiration policies to 
minimize the risks associated with personal identity information. 
Personal identity information303 is the data that presents the most serious privacy 
consequences.  Despite this, businesses tend to collect such information routinely, 
without identifying a clear business need and a plan for protecting the information 
adequately.304  Individuals are so accustomed to providing the information that many do 
not realize information like an email address qualifies as personal identity information.  
The issue of re-use, transfer, and aggregation means that RFID users must carefully 
consider the information required and balance that with the privacy concerns of 
individuals.  Keeping this data indefinitely increases the aggregation threat to individuals 
and risk of liability for data loss to the collectors.  A balance of interests necessarily must 
                                                 
302 The increased interest states are showing in legislating RFID presents inefficiencies for businesses 
required to address the varying requirements of each state based on antiquated notions of privacy.  See 
supra Part II.C.2.  But see Nehf, supra note 140, at 55 (suggesting a passive approach to privacy legislation 
and stating: “Because information privacy in the digital era is still a relatively new concern, a consensus 
about legitimate entitlements has yet to coalesce. Through experience and experimentation over time, 
however, those entitlements may emerge.”); Stein, supra note 113, at 22 (arguing for federal legislation to 
avoid the inefficiencies of differing state legislation). 
303 Personal identity information is any information that can reveal an individual’s identity (including phone 
number, name, address, physical characteristics, email address, Internet cookies, or personal identification 
numbers). 
304 The EU Data Privacy Directive contains stringent regulations concerning the collection and use of 
personal identity information.  See supra notes 91-95 and text accompanying.  
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go beyond cost-benefit analysis to consider the implications for individual privacy as 
detailed in the Integrative Considerations.305  
Expiration of the data collected is a best practice to address the Integrative 
Considerations.  Many businesses now include expiration of data to protect the privacy of 
their users.306  Although a range of time for holding personal identity information may be 
appropriate for different industries (shopping patterns as opposed to private medical data, 
for example), we recommend consideration of a twelve-month policy of holding data.  
Given the rapid dissemination of information and the lack of a universal verification 
system,307 twelve-month data expiration allows time for RFID users to utilize accurate 
data efficiently.   
The last goal for an RFID privacy policy potentially is the most difficult to self-
regulate.  The re-use and transfer of data is one way that businesses profit from a 
perceived asset of the business.  The Integrative Considerations gleaned from diverse 
academic disciplines demonstrate clearly that the expectation of individuals is for 
information to remain within expected networks so that the discloser can continue to 
coordinate the dissemination of that information.  Users of RFID devices should study the 
expected and reasonable network for any information collected through their RFID 
systems and limit re-use and transfer of data only to firms reasonably related to the initial 
recipient of information, as documented by the study.  Further, the firms that acquire the 
information must agree to the policy of data expiration and delete transferred data in their 
own systems consistent with the original collectors’ policy dating from the time it was 
originally collected, not transferred.308 
VI. CONCLUSION
RFID is a disruptive technology in that it represents a fundamental change in the way
individuals live and organizations function.  It is not the only disruptive technology with 
important privacy issues, but we have limited our focus here to applying research across 
disciplines to the RFID context.  At this juncture, a thoughtful approach to RFID 
standards is critical and that is not possible using outdated privacy models. 
We examined relevant research and literature from three diverse disciplines: 
behavioral economics, communications privacy management, and social networks.  From 
305 See Nehf, supra note 140, at 55 (noting the limitations of cost-benefit analysis in privacy policy, stating: 
“Setting privacy policy is different, however, because important costs and benefits associated with this 
basic entitlement cannot reliably be reduced to economic terms.”). 
306 See Rampell, supra note 3 (citing Google, Microsoft, Yahoo and AOL as companies that have 
implemented expiration dates for collected data ranging from 13 months to 18 months). 
307 But see Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2115 (recommending verification through a separate association of 
decentralized data markets).  
308 Self-regulation potentially could be accommodated within already-existing corporate social 
responsibility and ethics frameworks of the firm.  See Gary R. Weaver, Linda Klebe Trevino & Philip L. 
Cochran, Corporate Ethics Programs as Control Systems, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 41-57 (1999).  
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this research we advocate utilizing the Integrative Considerations to guide privacy policy.  
Finally, these Integrative Considerations can be applied to attempts at self-regulation of 
the privacy concerns raised by RFID devices.  In that regard, we recommend taking 
account of three crucial goals: limiting the types of information gathered, setting 
timelines for expiration of collected information, and protecting the information from re-
use and transfer. 
